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Abstract 
Signals Sell: Designing a Product Line when Consumers Have Social 
Image Concerns 
by Jana Friedrichsen* 
One important function of consumption is for consumers to show off their taste, virtue or 
wealth. While empirical observations suggest that producers take this into account, 
existing research has concentrated on analyzing the demand side. This paper investigates 
how a monopolist optimally designs its product line when consumers differ both in their 
taste for quality and their desire for a positive social image. The monopolist distorts 
qualities and prices to allocate images to consumers. It generically pools consumers with 
different tastes because high-taste consumers lend a positive image to the product of their 
choice and thereby increase the product’s value to others. Often, average quality is lower 
than in a market without image concerns and there is underprovision as compared to the 
welfare-maximizing allocation. Although average quality is higher in a competitive 
market, welfare typically is not. 
Keywords: image motivation, conspicuous consumption, two-dimensional screening, 
mechanism design 
JEL classification: D21, D82, L15 
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1. Introduction
Consumption is about satisfaction of needs. Partly these needs are addressed by the physical
nature of products: the mobile allows us to make calls and text, a wine tastes good, a car
provides mobility and comfort, and so forth. But we also consume because we want to show
off.1 Only a few decades ago, consumers mostly showed off their wealth, trying to “keep up
with the Joneses” by amassing as much new stuff as the neighbors. But when many goods are
affordable to almost everyone around them, and wealth may have become a less desirable char-
acteristic, consumers increasingly seek to advertise virtue or taste instead of pure wealth (Frick
and Hauser, 2008; The Economist, 2010). Although producers certainly cater to this desire—
several examples follow below—hardly any research has analyzed this response.2 Moreover, the
possibility that consumers buy to advertise another characteristic but wealth is typically ignored
in the literature. This paper contributes to filling this gap by analyzing how a strategic firm
adjusts the variety, qualities, and prices of its product line when individuals differ both in their
valuations of quality and their desire for social image.3
To analyze the supply side response to image concerns, I set up a simple model of markets
where consumers may derive utility from a product’s quality as well as from the image associated
with it. Types are binary in both dimensions but in contrast to existing research I do not
impose any restrictions on the correlation. The image of a product emerges endogenously
from the individual consumers’ consumption decisions as a product’s image is the conditional
expectation of a consumer’s taste for quality after purchases have been observed.4
Technology companies, wine makers, health clubs or hotel groups, fashion designers, and pro-
ducers of luxury products segment their markets by offering products that appeal to different
groups of people and their signaling desires. For instance, the fashion designer Armani differ-
entiates its product line into three tiers, distinct in style and price, that are tailored to different
sets of consumers (Amaldoss and Jain, 2010; Kotler and Keller, 2011, p. 320). Even though this
differentiation may partially be motivated by differential tastes for quality in the first place, the
three tiers are associated with different sets of customers and thereby public images. These im-
ages are themselves valued by customers and add to a product’s physical value thereby justifying
high price premia in the upper tiers. Mobile phones can also function as status goods (Abeele
et al., 2014). Apple’s iPhone, in particular, is in high demand partly for social positioning
reasons (Arruda-Filho and Lennon, 2011), and the design of Apple’s product line hints toward
image concerns being addressed. Section 2.1 provides more detailed empirical applications and
discusses where standard screening models that concentrate on the effects of heterogeneous
1Empirically, it is well-documented that consumers pay for demonstrating their wealth, taste, or preferences.
See for instance Chao and Schor 1998; Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz 2011; Sexton and Sexton 2014. A possible
mechanism to microfound such behavior is that being perceived as “good” increases an agent’s matching
opportunities and future payoffs (Pesendorfer, 1995; Rege, 2008).
2A large number of theoretical studies investigate how consumer behavior is affected by the desire to demonstrate
wealth but do not allow for strategic responses on the supply side (Veblen, 1915; Ireland, 1994; Bagwell and
Bernheim, 1996; Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997). The only study that investigates
strategic product design in this context, Rayo (2013), does not apply to the empirically relevant case that
the desire to signal is heterogeneous across consumers and negatively correlated with the characteristic to be
signaled. Section 8 provides a detailed discussion.
3The notion of quality is a general one here. For instance, quality can also refer to the extent to which
production is environmentally friendly. Instead of image motivation or image concern (for similar use see for
instance Ariely et al., 2009), others have used the terms signaling motivation, status concern, or conspicuous
consumption. Sometimes the meaning is restricted to the signaling of wealth. Cabral (2005) suggests using
“reputation” for situations “when agents believe a particular agent to be something.” As this is uncommon in
the relevant literature it is not used here.
4Consumption is conspicuous in that it provides evidence of the personal characteristic “taste for quality”.
Conspicuous consumption according to Veblen (1915, p. 47) is the “specialized consumption of goods as an
evidence of pecuniary strength”. Here, the “taste for quality” can be driven by wealth or expertise and thereby
signaling this trait can have similar benefits as signaling “pecuniary strength.”
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tastes for quality are insufficient to entirely explain the observed market segmentation and price
differences.
After discussing the empirical evidence, Sections 3 and 4 analyze image concerns in monopo-
listic markets. Monopoly captures an essential aspect of status goods, namely their inimitability,
and could reflect a firm with market power when it comes to wine, luxuries, or technology. Al-
ternatively, in the case of food items, we can think of a supermarket chain that is deciding which
product qualities to slot within a certain category and which prices to charge. The analysis re-
veals that monopolists react to the heterogeneity of image concerns by designing a product line
that always induces a partial pooling of consumers. The monopolist distorts product qualities
and prices differently than what would be predicted by differences in quality valuations alone
to induce this pooling. If the value of image is at an intermediate level, the monopolist offers a
product of intermediate quality in addition to the low and high quality product he would offer
in the absence of image concerns. The additional product offers prestige and symbolic benefits
as well as intermediate quality and allows the monopolist to profitably screen consumers with
respect to their willingness to pay a premium for image. Purely image-concerned consumers
pool with purely quality-concerned consumers and buy this product, which can be interpreted
as a “masstige” product (Truong et al., 2009; Heine, 2012). Therefore, in this scenario, later
termed image building, fewer consumers decide in favor of the lowest quality than if image
concerns were absent. The highest-quality product’s price reflects its premium image and is
attractive only to consumers who value both quality and image. Therefore, fewer consumers
choose high quality than in the absence of image concerns. Depending on the distribution of
consumer types, average quality in the market may then decrease if the value of image increases.
If image is very valuable, the monopolist offers only a low and an exclusive high quality product.
Prices are set such that the high quality product is only bought by consumers who value image
in addition to quality, whereas all others prefer the low quality product. Thus, average quality
in the market decreases for sure as compared to a model without image concerns when image
concerns become very strong.
In Section 5, I study a perfectly competitive setting. This allows me to disentangle the effects
of strategic consumer behavior from those due to strategic supply. I show that firms operating
in perfect competition cannot exploit image concerns to make positive profits. Still if the value
of image is sufficiently high, image concerns remain relevant in a market where producers are
price-takers, but the predicted distortions are different than in monopoly. As prices are driven
down to marginal cost, consumers cannot use prices to signal their interest in quality—as a
monopolist’s product line would encourage them to do. Instead, consumers who value both
image and quality buy inefficiently high quality, which serves as a functional excuse to separate
from lower valuation consumers. Such a high quality product is too expensive for purely image-
concerned consumers even if it is sold at marginal cost. Purely image-concerned consumers pool
with purely quality-concerned consumers on a lower quality product that has the same quality
level as the “high-quality” product by the monopolist. In contrast to this upward distortion in
competitive qualities, monopoly induces separation by a downward distortion in quality. A key
result is that quality is on average higher in competition than in monopoly. Welfare, however,
is often higher in monopoly than in competition. The reason is that consumers buy excessive
quality in the competitive market to acquire a good image. Producing these quality levels, and
therefore this way of signaling, is inefficient. A monopolist allows for less wasteful signaling
by restricting the product line. The policy implications therefore differ with respect to market
structure. Although monopoly achieves product differentiation by a low-quality product, the
introduction of a minimum quality standard is shown to weakly decrease welfare and consumer
surplus. In a competitive market, the allocation is inefficient due to an upward distorted high-
quality product: a luxury tax strictly increases welfare but does not in general yield a Pareto
improvement.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I first discuss empirical examples
where firm behavior is consistent with predictions of my model for heterogeneous image concerns.
I also present empirical support of a negative correlation between intrinsic quality concerns and
image motivation, which is the arguably most interesting case of my model. Then, I introduce
the monopolistic model and discuss two benchmark cases in Section 3, and analyze the full
model in Section 4. Section 5 then studies heterogeneous image concerns in a competitive
market. Section 6 addresses welfare implications and possible policy interventions, and Section
7 presents generalizations and extensions. In Section 8, I discuss how my work relates to the
literature before I conclude in Section 9. Proofs which are not included in the main text are
contained in Appendix A. Appendix B provides supplementary material.
2. Empirical relevance of heterogeneous image concerns
2.1. Supply side caters to (heterogeneous) image concerns
Example 1: Apple and the iPhone The iPhone signals something about its owner and apparently,
Apple’s customers are willing to pay a substantial premium for this signal. The first generation
of iPhones was marketed clearly as an exclusive product, of interest only to people who needed
the phone’s technological features and were willing to pay a premium for being among those first
adopters (Arruda-Filho et al., 2010). While Apple has always targeted a market segment that
is willing to buy into the brand prestige, the company has recently moved toward segmenting
its market further. Until the iPhone 5, Apple introduced new iPhone models one at a time.
The iPhone 5C and iPhone 5S, however, were introduced simultaneously. While the iPhone 5C
lacks some features of the iPhone 5S (reduced quality), the signaling part is more prominent in
form of the colorful casing. Offering these two version simultaneously allowed Apple to price-
discriminate between those consumers who wanted to have the most high-end product and those
who wanted to be seen with a new iPhone but were less interested in new features. Interestingly,
Apple made sure that the different versions could be distinguished from each other through their
design. The move to simultaneous versions occurred at a time when Apple’s brand value and
stock prices stagnated and even decreased. Apple’s behavior could indicate a decreasing value
of image, to which a masstige strategy was the answer in line with my model.5
Example 2: Bordeaux Wines The finest wine producers in France, particularly in the Bordeaux
region, commonly offer a so-called“second label wine” in addition to their first label. The second
wine is produced from grapes grown on the same estate, but it may be based on special plots
or vines that are younger or do not perform as well. Depending on the quality of the vintage,
a house may allocate a larger part or even all of the harvest to its second wine so as not to
compromise the reputation of its Grand vin. While the quality difference may be small, the
price differential is typically large. According to an empirical study by Ashenfelter (2008),
there are two motivations for buying mature Bordeaux: interest in the wine itself and interest
in the status symbol. In line with my theoretical analysis for the heterogeneous purchasing
motives documented in Ashenfelter (2008), wine producers have adopted a two-tier product
line. The Grand vin of superior quality receives an enormous image premium that is paid buy
those who want a status symbol but also value the underlying quality. The lower quality second
5See http://www.statista.com/statistics/326052/apple-brand-value/ and http://finance.yahoo.com
for the numbers. In line with the brand value increasing again as indicated by increasing stock prices during
2014, Apple appears to go back to an exclusive market strategy with the newest generation. While most
features are the same, the iPhone 6 Plus is larger and has much better power and battery than the iPhone
6. Thus, the iPhone 6 Plus is a rather different product than the iPhone 6 which is of typical size. In
contrast, the functional differences between iPhone 5C and 5S are much smaller and appear to be more
artificial. The simultaneous introduction of iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus could be an attempt of classical
price-discrimination along the dimension of features. For features and introduction dates of the iPhone see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPhone.
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label wine appeals to those who are unwilling to pay a reputation premium for the Grand vin
and choose the second label for its good quality-to-price ratio. But the second label wine also
appeals to those who care mostly about the associated image, possibly because they are ignorant
of the quality; they buy for the good image-to-price ratio. The image of a great wine maker’s
second label is considerably better than the image associated with an unknown producer’s wine.
Moreover, the (expected) quality of this wine is higher than that of the unknown wine.
Example 3: Hotel chains Hotels offer opportunities to meet people, and for some it is impor-
tant what type of person they are perceived as in such encounters: Business hotel customers pay
high rates in upper end hotels also to impress business contacts, and hotels appeal to images that
are consistent with the signaling desires of their guests to increase customer satisfaction (Back,
2005). A hotel chain caters to image concerns by offering different hotel categories, sometimes
under the same brand name. For instance, Accor has luxury hotels named Sofitel, Novotel and
Mercure in the upscale range, Ibis Red and Ibis Styles in the Midscale, and Ibis Budget in the
Economy range.6 Across hotel categories, not only service quality but also the cliente`le and
the associated image differ, and hotels appear to be charging for it. Similar strategies can be
observed for health clubs, which again are places where people do not only train but also meet.
Example 4: Socially Responsible Products It has become increasingly important to consumers
that goods are ethically acceptable and sustainably produced. The market for organic products
grew on average by more than 14% per year between 1999 and 2007 (Sahota, 2009), and Fair-
trade sales experienced two-digit annual growth rates during recent years in many European
markets (http://www.fairtrade.net/annual-reports.html). At the same time these goods
are becoming status symbols (Kapferer, 2010; Frick and Hauser, 2008, p. 28). Empirical stud-
ies find that higher prices for green products can be partly explained by image concerns (e.g
Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2009; Griskevicius et al., 2010; Sexton and Sexton, 2014). While there
is much acceptance of the mainstreaming of responsible consumption, critical voices lament a
dilution of the underlying principles as products are tailored to a broader audience (for instance
Clark, 2011 and Stevens, 2011). According to my model, this observation is consistent with a
discounter optimizing its product listings in response to rising image concerns:7 To profit from
image concerns and attract consumers who do not so much care about sustainable production
per se, the discounter will offer an inferior version of a sustainable product, probably an own-
brand product, in addition to the fully sustainable product, which can consequently be sold at
a premium. In line with this, the independent German testing organization Stiftung Warentest
has recently found that organge juice of the discounter Lidl’s Fairglobe (Lidl’s own-brand car-
rying the Fairtrade logo) does not satisfy basic requirements with respect to labor conditions
and environment (Stiftung Warentest, 2014). Still, Lidl’s Fairglobe products sell very well and
have contributed to the increase in market size for Fairtrade products.
Also, the soft drinks “ChariTea” and “LemonAid” clearly appeal to non-consumption values
through their names and the bottles are easily recognized even from a distance through their
unusual design.8 At a local German supermarket, a consumer will pay about 1.30 Euro for a
330ml bottle of ChariTea or LemonAid while a same-sized soft drink that fulfills comparable
social and environmental standards sells at less than a Euro per 330ml bottle. This price differ-
6This is only one example. Among others, also Best Western Hotels, Choice Hotels, Hilton Worldwide, and
Hyatt Hotels Corporation offer hotels in different categories targeting different sets of consumers. These are
brand extensions in the form of vertical line extensions (Keller, 2015). Product and brand images have been
shown to be crucial for such extensions (e.g. Kirmani et al., 1999). The marketing literature offers many
empirical studies but little theoretical background for the estimated effects.
7In accordance with my model, producers engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategically (Kitz-
mueller and Shimshack, 2012): they green their production or tighten social standards to better tailor the
products to individuals’ demand for responsible products for profit-maximizing reasons. Producers and trad-
ing companies might of course themselves have intrinsic concerns for ethical production. This is not included
in my model.
8These two drinks are advertised with “Drinking helps!”. See http://www.lemon-aid.de/ and Figure B1 in
Appendix B.
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ence cannot be justified by the 5 Cents donation per bottle to charitable projects alone.9 Bars
and Cafe´s where consumption is more visible and signaling desires more relevant (Griskevicius
et al., 2007) are frequent outlets for these drinks, making image concerns the most plausible
explanation for the price premium. Quality-based models would not predict higher popularity
of responsible products in public spaces.
Recently, several long-standing firms in Fairtrade and organic production have introduced
their own standards which lie above the one implemented in mainstream retailing.10 This is
compatible with my results and can thus be interpreted as a reaction to increased competition
from discounters and supermarkets.11 An increase in the valuations for Fairtrade and organic
products would similarly predict an increase in top quality. However, if consumers value only
quality, it is puzzling that the low-quality alternative is unchanged or even worsens: The joint
occurrence of both events can be explained by quality concerns only if there are heterogeneous
changes in preferences. In contrast, their joint occurrence exactly matches my predictions if
consumers also have image concerns and the signaling value of sustainable consumption increases
in response to increased public attention to environmental and social issues.
Example 5: Luxury Products Luxury products are typically bought because of the associated
prestige as well as their intrinsic quality. Expressive purchase motives like status concerns
increase their importance relative to intrinsic ones such as quality the more visibly a product
is consumed (Hudders, 2012). Producers of luxury or premium products regularly face the
challenge of increasing their market share through lower-priced lines while not jeopardizing the
prestige of the company’s products (Chen, 2013). One example to address this challenge is
that producers segment the market for luxury handbags by offering “loud” and “quiet” bags.
The loud ones carry a visible brand logo and tailor to consumers who want to signal aﬄuence
through their brand choice but lack connoisseurship. The quiet bags, in contrast, do not carry
a visible brand logo such that they can be used for signaling only by those who know and value
the subtle design and quality of the bag itself. According to Han et al. (2010), Gucci and Luis
Vuitton sell quieter handbags and shoes at a price premium, and similarly, it is the lower-priced
cars by Mercedes that carry a larger emblems. This is consistent with a market segmentation
strategy where the premium consumers who are able to judge the product’s quality and desire
to signal their superiority are separated from those who either lack the knowledge for quality or
are not willing to pay an image premium (note that even the larger emblem cars and the loud
bags are usually of high quality).12 A purely quality-based segmentation, in contrast, cannot
explain the loud-quiet distinction. Alternatively, loud bags might be cheaper to compensate
consumers for being ad-carriers for the respective brand. Given that many consumers want to
be recognized as wearing the brand, this is unlikely to be the sole explanation for the observed
patterns either.
Example 6: Cars Automobile manufacturers usually offer product lines, and social status has
come to be associated more with particular vehicles than with the manufacturer itself. Luxury
cars such as Lexus, Mercedes S-class, or Tesla offer not only increased comfort and safety to
their owners as compared to less expensive variants from the same manufacturers, but they also
confer status benefits. The associated status depends on price, style, and engineering of the
9Information regarding the donation cannot be found on the bottles or the shelves and not on the product’s
website either but only in an interview with the founders (Baurmann, 2013).
10See for instance http://fair-plus.de/, and Purvis (2008) on Fairtrade. For organic products, a number of
voluntary agreements exist which enforce more stringent standards than e.g the certified organic standard of
the European Union (see http://www.ifoam.org/sub/faq.html).
11Such coexistence of monopoly and competitive predictions may be observed if purchasing modes vary: some
consumers choose first which quality they want to buy and select the outlet accordingly. This competitive
element leads to excessive quality. Others first pick an outlet and then a quality within this outlet’s portfolio.
This monopoly element leads to the availability of lower quality products.
12Han et al. (2010) employ a consumer categorization that differs from the one used in this paper. In particular,
they assume a distinction in connoissership which together with wealth and income determines the marginal
utility from quality. Moreover, they assume that what the different consumers want to signal is not identical.
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car but also on public opinion (Berger, 2001, p. 160). Moreover, Mercedes Benz introduced the
BlueTEC and BlueEFFICIENCY label that additionally allow consumers to signal their concern
for the environment in several categories of cars.13 Mercedes thereby addresses signaling desires
in several dimensions: wealth through size of the car and environmental preferences through
the label (see Section 7.2).
2.2. Intrinsic motivation and image concerns correlate negatively
The predictions derived for the monopoly market are most interesting in the case where the
intrinsic interest in quality and image concerns are uncorrelated or negatively correlated.14 I am
not aware of any study documenting a positive correlation even though it is not unreasonable
to expect those with a high taste for quality care more about their reputation than others.
On the other hand, those who highly value quality, know that they do and may have less of a
benefit from demonstrating this to others. Those who value quality less may benefit more from
being held for better-reputed quality lovers. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that intrinsic
interest and image concerns are negatively correlated.
The cleanest evidence to my knowledge is a laboratory experiment by Friedrichsen and En-
gelmann (2013), in which we test whether intrinsically motivated individuals exhibit stronger
or less pronounced image concerns when it comes to buying Fairtrade chocolate. We show that
there is a negative relationship: those who do not value Fairtrade chocolate intrinsically, exhibit
stronger image concerns.
A number of other studies provide indirect evidence of a negative correlation. For instance,
Truong and McColl (2011) argue that the correlation between intrinsic purchasing motives and
signaling is negative in the context of luxury consumption, and Vermeir and Verbeke (2006)
present similar findings in the context of socially responsible consumption. Results by Riedl and
Smeets (2015) indicate a negative correlation between intrinsic motivation and image concerns
among financial investors. The authors combine experimental data on intrinsic social prefer-
ences of investors with administrative data about these investors’ portfolios from a mutual fund
and with survey data on the investors’ motivations. Social preferences are found to predict in-
vestment in socially responsible mutual funds only if these are not associated with tax benefits.
Moreover, the results suggest that “selfish” investors invest in socially responsible mutual funds
without tax benefits for signaling reasons. No evidence for signaling motivations is found for
those who are classified as pro-social. Field experimental evidence from Germany (Boyer et al.,
2014; Dwenger et al., 2016) as well a an empirical analysis of Italian tax records (Filippin et al.,
2013) indicate that those who are intrinsically motivated to pay taxes are less subject to image
concerns.
3. Monopolistic quality provision and image concerns: Model and
benchmarks
3.1. The model
Consider a monopolist who sells products of potentially different quality to heterogeneous con-
sumers from a population of unit mass. Quality is chosen by the monopolist on a continuous
scale and perfectly observable. A product is a combination of quality and price and is in equilib-
rium associated with an image that reflects which consumer types buy the respective product.
13See http://www.mercedes-benz.com/fleet-CO2.
14How much value is attributed to the image of being quality-concerned can depend on the social institutions in
a society, modeled as matching patterns (Mailath and Postlewaite, 2006). Theoretically, agents may therefore
differ in image concerns because they engage in types of interactions where the other’s type is more payoff-
relevant or less so.
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Consumers’ utility depends positively on quality s ∈ R≥0 and image (or reputation) R ∈
[0, 1], and negatively on price p ∈ R≥0 of a product. Consumers can differ in both, their
taste for quality σ and their image concern ρ. The two-dimensional type (σ, ρ) is drawn from
{σL, σH} × {0, 1} with Prob(σ = σH) = β, Prob(ρ = 1|σ = σH) = αs, and Prob(ρ = 1|σ =
σL) = αn. To simplify the exposition, I work with σL = 0 and σH = 1 in the main part of
the paper. Section 7.1 discusses how this affects results. The resulting four different types of
consumers are indexed by σρ; their frequencies are stated in Table 1. For a consumer of type
σρ, utility takes the form:
(1) Uσρ(s, p,R) = σs+ ρλR− p
The parameter λ > 0 describes the value of image relative to the marginal utility from
quality.15 The image R of consumer (σ, ρ) is the expectation of his quality preference parameter
σ conditional on his purchasing decision. It reflects an outside spectator’s (or the consumer
mass’) inference of a consumer’s interest in quality. A formal definition of image follows with
the equilibrium definition in Section 3.3.
Table 1: Consumer types and their frequencies.
image concern
no yes
ρ = 0 ρ = 1
∑
quality concern
no: σ = 0 (1− β)(1− αn) (1− β)αn (1− β)
yes: σ = 1 β(1− αs) βαs β
The monopolist offers a product line M ⊂ R2≥0 to maximize expected profit. Perfect price
discrimination is impossible because consumers are privately informed about their types. The
monopolist has prior beliefs about the distribution of of consumer types that are identical with
the actual distribution. He chooses a product line such that consumers self-select (second-degree
price discrimination). The monopolist cannot choose image directly, but takes into account
which image will be associated with each of its products in equilibrium. Unit costs are assumed
to be linear in quantity sold and convex increasing in quality, specifically c(s) = 12s
2.16
Each consumer can choose a preferred product from the line of quality-price offers or decide
not to buy any of them. The latter case corresponds to obtaining the outside good of zero
quality at a price of zero. Reservation utility is then equal to the utility derived from the image
of non-buyers (=outside good buyers). The analysis remains essentially unchanged if buying
an outside good with zero quality gives the same utility, say a¯, for all consumers. Voluntary
participation is taken care off by requiring the outside option (0, 0) to be part of the product
line M.17 If the monopolist allocates (0, 0) to a consumer type this means this type chooses
the outside option.
3.2. The structure
The distribution of σ and ρ and the value of λ are common knowledge and so is the setup of the
market interaction. Consumers have private information about their types. Quality is correctly
15Alternatively I could allow for (σ, ρ) drawn from {0, σ¯}×{0, ρ¯} for arbitrary σ¯, ρ¯ > 0. This is equivalent to my
formulation with λ = ρ¯
σ¯
. Since λ gives the relative weight on image concerns I can also rewrite the analysis
with a weight γ ∈ [0, 1] on image and a weight 1− γ on quality such that I obtain the above formulation with
λ = γ
1−γ .
16Specifying a functional form allows to obtain closed form solutions. The results are qualitatively the same with
constant unit costs c(s) = c (see Appendix B.9).
17In the following, taking (0, 0) will also be referred to as non-participation since this is its meaning. Strictly
speaking all types participate by construction.
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perceived by consumers; cheating on quality is prevented e.g. through third-party verification
or because it is obvious from inspection.
The timing is as follows:
(i) The monopolist offers a product line M. Qualities and prices are observed by all con-
sumers.
(ii) Types are drawn and each consumers privately learns his type σρ.
(iii) All consumers simultaneously choose a product (s, p)σρ ∈ M which maximizes utility for
their type.
(iv) Images associated with each product and payoffs realize.
In this model, the utility of a consumer does not only depend on his action but also on beliefs
about his type. Thus, the game analyzed here falls into what is called perception games by
Gradwohl and Smorodinsky (2014) and it is similar to psychological games (Geanakoplos et al.,
1989) in which a player’s utility depends on all players’ actions and on the player’s beliefs about
others’ strategy profiles. Formally, one can represent images as a consumer’s perception of the
beliefs that an implicit third player forms about his type after consumption decision have been
executed. This inactive player may exists in reality or only in the consumer’s imagination.
3.3. Equilibrium
In the presence of image concerns the product line offered by the monopolist induces a game
among consumers. Image-concerned consumers’ payoffs depend on image and thereby on equi-
librium play. Consumers form beliefs about which products other consumer types buy and
take this into account when deciding on their purchases. Consumers who value image have an
incentive to buy a product which they believe is bought by consumers with an intrinsic interest
in quality since this signals caring about quality and is rewarded with a higher image. Whether
or not a consumer cares about image does not influence his image directly but influences the
choice of a product and can thereby indirectly impact on the image. Image depends on the
partition of consumers on different products and thereby only indirectly on absolute product
quality.
For every product line M ∈ P(R2≥0) the choice correspondence bM : {0, 1}2 → M states
which product (s, p) ∈M is chosen by consumer type σρ. For every product line M the belief
function µM : M → [0, 1] assigns probabilities to a consumer having σ = 1 given that she
buys a specific product (s, p) or does not participate. Beliefs are assumed to be identical for all
consumers. Since there is a belief function for each product line, the same product occurring
in different product lines can be associated with different beliefs. In equilibrium the posterior
belief and thereby images must be consistent with Bayes’ rule, that is they must reflect the
actual distribution of types. Given that a choice occurs with positive probability the posterior
belief µM must fulfill
(2) µM(s, p) =
∑
ρ=0,1 Prob(1, ρ)Prob(bM(1ρ) = (s, p))∑
σ=0,1
∑
ρ=0,1 Prob(σ, ρ)Prob(bM(σρ) = (s, p))
Definition 1. Given any product line M, a pure-strategy equilibrium in the consumption stage
is a set of functions bM : {0, 1}2 →M and µM :M→ [0, 1] such that
(i) bM(σρ) ∈ argmax(s,p)∈Mσs+ ρλR(s, p)− p for σ, ρ ∈ {0, 1} (Utility maximization).
(ii) R(s, p,M) = E[σ|bM(σρ) = (s, p)] = µM(s, p) and µM is defined in (2) if (s, p) is chosen
with positive probability and µM ∈ [0, 1] otherwise (Bayesian Inference).
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Mixed-strategy equilibrium is defined accordingly.
An equilibrium of the complete game is given by a product line M, a correspondence bM
and a belief function µM such that among the feasible product lines, M gives the highest
profit to the producer given that for each feasible product line consumer behavior is consistent
with equilibrium as defined in Definition 1.18 This equilibrium definition corresponds to a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in an extended game, where consumers are punished whenever
their perceived image does not coincide with the Bayesian posterior. To simplify notation, in
the following the argument M in the image is dropped unless this creates ambiguities.
I assume throughout that in case of multiple equilibria in the consumption stage, the preferred
equilibrium of the monopolist is played. Furthermore, let the following tie-breaking rule hold
for consumers who value quality but not image to facilitate the analysis.19
Assumption 1. Consumers with σ = 1, ρ = 0 always buy (s, p) if indifferent with not partici-
pating, i.e. if U10(s, p) = s− p = 0 = U10(0, 0).
The monopolist solves the following Problem (3).
max
M
∑
σ,ρ∈{0,1}
∑
(s,p)∈M
Prob(σ, ρ)Prob(bM(σρ) = (s, p))(p− c(s))(3)
s.t.
(ICσρ−σ′ρ′) σsσρ + ρλR(sσρ, pσρ)− pσρ ≥ σsσ′ρ′ + ρλR(sσ′ρ′ , pσ′ρ′)− pσ′ρ′
for σ, ρ, σ′, ρ′ ∈ {0, 1} and (σ, ρ) 6= (σ′, ρ′)
(PCσρ) σsσρ + ρλR(sσρ, pσρ)− pσρ ≥ ρλR(0, 0)
for σ, ρ ∈ {0, 1}
(BI) R(sσρ, pσρ) = E[σ|bM = (sσρ, pσρ)] for all (sσρ, pσρ) ∈M, σ, ρ ∈ {0, 1}
which are bought with positive probability in equilibrium
Lemma 1. (Existence) For each product offer of the monopolist there exists a (not necessarily
pure-strategy) equilibrium in the consumption stage.
For some product lines, a pure-strategy equilibrium in the consumption stage does not exist.
Example 1. Suppose the monopolist offers M = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} and λ ∈ (1, β+αn(1−β)β ). Type
01 does better buying (1, 1) than not buying when none of his type buys. However, when all of
his type buy (1, 1) he does better not buying. In any equilibrium in the consumption stage, type
01 randomizes between the two products.
With a continuum of consumers, this randomization can be interpreted as shares of con-
sumers of the same type choosing different actions with certainty. At the population level this
corresponds to a mixed strategy. While mixed strategies are required to prove existence of
equilibrium in every subgame, the product lines for which only mixed-strategy equilibria exist
are not profitable to the monopolist (see Appendix B.8). The following derivations therefore
concentrate on the monopolist offering a product line which induces a pure-strategy equilibrium
in the consumption stage.
18With slight abuse of notation I do not distinguish between the sets of offered and accepted products but denote
both byM. Since the two sets can only differ in options not taken in equilibrium one could assume an  cost
for putting a product on the market to ensure that the monopolist offers only products which are accepted in
equilibrium.
19Allowing the monopolist to select an equilibrium amounts to the monopolist maximizing also over µM in
Problem 3. Each consumer in the continuum is atomless so that individual deviations are not profitable.
However, sometimes profitable collective deviations exist and lead to multiple equilibria. Qualitatively similar
results hold up when one instead assumes that, in every subgame, consumers coordinate on the equilibrium
which maximizes consumer surplus (see Appendix B.7). In Appendix B, I also relax Assumption 1 and show
that it does not qualitatively affect the results.
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3.4. Benchmark cases: nobody or everyone values image
This section shows that homogeneous image concerns do not influence the production of quality.
If either no consumer cares about image, or all consumers care about image, the monopolist
faces only two consumer types: A fraction β of consumers value quality (σ = 1), the others do
not.20
Lemma 2. (No image concern) If αs = αn = 0, the unique equilibrium is separating.
Consumers obtain (s, p) = (1, 1) if they value quality and (0, 0) otherwise.
Lemma 3. (Homogeneous image concern) If αs = αn = 1, the unique equilibrium is
separating. Consumers buy (1, 1 + λ) if they value quality and (0, 0) otherwise. The images
associated with the products in equilibrium are R(0, 0) = 0 and R(1, 1 + λ) = 1.
Without image concerns, consumer surplus equals zero. The monopolist receives the entire
surplus β(s1− c(s1)) = β2 . A formal proof of this standard result (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont,
2004, p. 52ff) is omitted here. Homogeneous image concerns increase the utility of buying
a product which is bought by good types and thereby increase the price a monopolist can
charge for it without changing the allocation of quality. The prize increase corresponds exactly
to the image gain and aggregate consumer surplus is zero. The image concern increases the
monopolist’s profits by βλ. If p > s, the monopolist charges an image-premium, which is
justified through the consumers’ willingness to pay for the image associated with the product.21
4. Monopoly with heterogeneous image concerns
This section covers the general case of Problem 3, where consumers may differ in their marginal
utility from quality σ ∈ {0, 1} as well as their marginal utility from image ρ ∈ {0, 1}. To abstract
from less interesting non-generic cases, I assume that each of the four feasible consumer types
is indeed present in the market.
Assumption 2. All consumer types occur with positive probability, β, αs, αn ∈ (0, 1).
4.1. The consumption stage
The four consumer types can theoretically split into groups in 15 different ways. But only four
types of pure-strategy partitions in the consumption stage are consistent with profit maximiza-
tion. Since in equilibrium, the monopolist maximizes its profits, it is without loss of generality
that other partitions in the consumption stage are not characterized here. I begin the analysis
with reducing the set of equilibrium candidates to those where partial pooling occurs.
Lemma 4. A fully separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. In a fully separating equilibrium, consumer types must be correctly identified with re-
spect to their interest in quality since their purchases disclose their types. This prevents purely
image-concerned consumers from buying positive quality since this alone is worthless to them.
Thereby they pool with consumers interested in neither image nor quality on the outside option
(0, 0).
Moreover, pure image goods which would be bought by all image-concerned consumers irre-
spective of their quality concern are not viable.
20With full information and the ability to price-discriminate between consumers efficient qualities without and
with image concerns are s∗0, s
∗
1 such that c
′(s0) = 0 and c′(s1) = 1. This implies s∗0 = 0 and s
∗
1 = 1.
21Lemmas 2 and 3 are easily generalized to allow for 0 < σL < σH or a continuous distribution of quality valu-
ations. The optimal product line features the same qualities in the situation without and with homogeneous
image concerns, and image concerns lead to price increases corresponding to the image gain provided by a
specific product.
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Lemma 5. A pure image good equilibrium in which image-concerned consumers choose (s, p) 6=
(0, 0) and those unconcerned with image the outside good does not exist.
A pure image good would allow the monopolist to fully charge consumers for the value of
their image gain without incurring any costs of producing quality which purely image-concerned
consumers would not pay for.22 However, exactly these consumers lower the image associated
with the pure image good whereas the outside option is associated with a positive image too
since purely quality-concerned consumers choose it. So the gain in image when choosing the
image good is relatively low. In fact, the monopolist makes strictly higher profits by pooling
the purely image-concerned with the purely quality-concerned consumers and those who value
neither quality nor image (cf. exclusive good as will be described in Proposition 1). This
deteriorates the image on the outside good and improves the image on the good sold.
Proposition 1 rules out all remaining but four specific product lines. In the proof, I first
exclude all but four partitions of consumers as inconsistent with profit maximization. Second,
I derive the prices and qualities which maximize the monopolist’s profit subject to the corre-
sponding incentive compatibility and participation constraints given each of the four partitions
and optimal consumer behavior.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, only a standard good, a mass market, an image building product
line, or an exclusive good as specified in Table 2 may be offered by the monopolist.
Table 2: Equilibrium candidates from Proposition 1, products stated as (quality,price), purchas-
ing group in curly brackets. Consumer types choosing (0, 0) are omitted.
σρ λ ≤ 1 1 < λ ≤ λ1 λ1 < λ ≤ λ2 λ2 < λ ≤ 2 λ > 2
standard {10,11} (1,1) (λ, λ) n.a.
mass {01,10,11} (λ ββ+αn(1−β) , λ
β
β+αn(1−β)) (1,1)
image {01,10} (λ (1−αs)β(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) , λ
(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β)) (1,1)
building {11} (1, 1 + λ αn(1−β)(1−αs)β+αn(1−β)) (1, 1 + λ
αn(1−β)
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β))
exclusive {11} (1, 1 + λ 1−β1−αsβ )
λ1 =
αn(1−β)+β
β , λ2 =
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β
The standard good is identical to the separating product offer without image concerns (see
Lemma 2); all quality-concerned consumers buy a product (s, p) 6= (0, 0) whether or not they
are also interested in image. In a mass market consumers who value neither quality nor image
are excluded while all consumers who value at least one of the two characteristics buy the
same product. The image building product line offers two distinct products, a lower quality,
lower price version for consumers who value neither image nor quality and a premium version
for image-concerned consumers with a taste for quality. The premium product offers higher
quality and higher image at a higher price. If the value of image is large, the two products can
even have the same quality and differ only in image and price. Prices are chosen strategically
and induce consumers who value only image not to imitate those who value both quality and
image. If the monopolist sells an exclusive good, this product—independently of the value of
image—features the quality level that would be first-best without image concerns. A premium
price reflecting the image gain is sufficient to deter purely image-concerned consumers from
buying this product because the cost of quality exceeds their willingness-to-pay. At the same
22Note that the monopolist cannot profit from offering any positive quality for either of the two products. Either
product is supposed to be bought by a consumer whose willingness to pay for quality is zero so that it cannot
charge any positive price for quality.
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Standard good:
ignore image
s = 1
p = 1
R = 1
don’t buy
R = 0
σ = 0
σ = 1
ρ = 0 ρ = 1
Mass market:
pool all
s = 1
R < 1
p = 1
don’t buy
R = 0
σ = 0
σ = 1
ρ = 0 ρ = 1
Image building:
product differentiation
sh = 1
ph > 1
R = 1
don’t buy
R=0
sl ≤ 1
pl = sl
R < 1
sl ≤ 1
R < 1
pl = slσ = 0
σ = 1
ρ = 0 ρ = 1
Exclusive good:
reduce market
s = 1
R = 1
p > 1
don’t buy
R > 0
σ = 0
σ = 1
ρ = 0 ρ = 1
Figure 1: Possible market partitions in equilibrium (Proposition 1).
time, however, the price premium is so high that it renders the exclusive product unattractive to
purely quality-concerned consumers who therefore choose the outside good too. The purchasing
behavior of consumers is illustrated in Figure 1.
4.2. Profit maximization
Having understood how consumers behave for a given product line, I identify for each value of
image, which product line the monopolist offers to maximize its profits.
Proposition 2. There exist 0 < λ˜m ≤ ˜˜λm such that the profit-maximizing product offer of a
monopolistic producer is given by
(i) standard good if λ ≤ λ˜m.
(ii) image building if λ˜m ≤ λ ≤ ˜˜λm.
(iii) exclusive good if λ ≥ ˜˜λm.
If αs >
1
3 and β <
3αs−1
αs+α2s
and αn <
β(1+αs(β+αsβ−3))2
4αs(1−β)2 , then λ˜m =
˜˜
λm. Thus, only standard good
and exclusive good can be optimal.
In the proof, the characterization of products from Proposition 1 is used to compute profit as a
function of λ for each product line. The optimal product offer for each distribution of preferences
and each value of image is derived by comparing profits across product lines. The profit-
maximizing product line, optimal consumer behavior, and consistent beliefs together constitute
the equilibrium of the complete game.
The mass market is always dominated by an image building product line. The latter allows to
charge consumers a premium if they value image and quality without compromising too much
on profits on the other consumers. The threshold values for λ depend on the parameters but
holding fixed a parameter set, the equilibrium is a standard good for low λ, an exclusive good
for high λ and possibly image building for intermediate values of λ.
Corollary 1. The interval of λ where image building is optimal is empty only if image concerns
and intrinsic motivation are positively correlated, αn < αs.
Figure 2 illustrates the findings of Proposition 2. The underlying intuition is as follows. Image
concerns only matter if they are intense enough. For λ close to zero, profits with the exclusive
good and profits from image building are lower than profits from standard good so that offering
a standard good must be optimal. Since not all consumers value image, the monopolist cannot
charge an image-premium and the offer is identical to the one observed in the absence of image
concerns (cf. Section 3.4).
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λ0
standard good
λ˜m
image building
1
˜˜
λm
exclusive good
2
Figure 2: Equilibrium in monopoly.
average
quality
λ
0
standard good
λ˜m
image building
1
˜˜
λm
exclusive good
β
λβ(1− αs) + βαs
β + (1− β)αn
βαs
Figure 3: Average quality in a monopoly market. In the absence of image concerns, average
quality equals β.
When image concerns become more important, λ increases, profits from image building and
exclusive good increase in λ while standard good profits remain constant or even decrease.
Thus, the monopolist profits from modifying the product line. For intermediate values of image
concerns, two products are sold and all consumers who value quality or image buy. One product
is of high-quality and sells with an image-premium; the other is priced at the monopoly price
for quality23, can be of lower quality, and has lower image. The introduction of the low quality
into the market allows the monopolist to “build image” and sell to more consumers as well as
increase prices for those who value both image and quality. When image concerns become even
more important, the monopolist has an incentive to market a high-quality product exclusively
to consumers who value both image and quality, so that the share of consumers buying high
quality decreases as compared to the benchmark cases.
Suppose we are interested in the quality of a randomly chosen product in the market. Each
consumer who does not buy from the monopolist is assumed to consume the outside option,
which is a product of zero quality. Average quality in the market is the sum of the fractions
of consumers multiplied with the quality of the product that they buy in equilibrium. An
implication of Proposition 2 is that average quality is not in general increasing in the value of
image as illustrated in Figure 3. The reason is that changes in the value of image may induce
the monopolist to offer a different product line which affects the average quality level due to a
reduction in product quality (moving from standard good to image building) or due to a reduced
share of the market being served by the monopolist (moving from image building to exclusive
good).
Corollary 2. There exist parameters such that an increase in the value of image λ decreases
the average quality in the monopoly market.
More comparative statics results are contained in Appendix B.1. Testable predictions that
follow from the formal results are discussed below.
4.3. Testable predictions
First, we can compare a market without image concerns to one with image concerns but with the
same fraction of intrinsically motivated consumers and the same market structure. Alternatively,
23This equals the marginal cost of increasing quality, s, and has to be distinguished from the unit cost 1
2
s2. For
s < 2 the monopoly price is greater than the unit cost such that the monopolist makes positive profits from
selling.
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we can investigate changes in the strength of image concerns, given that the distribution of
preferences remains constant. This yields predictions 1 and 2. Second, we can analyze one
particular market over time. If we can observe not only changes in qualities and prices but are
able to get an idea of changes in the preference distribution, we obtain predictions 3 and 4.
Prediction 1. As compared to a market without or with smaller image concerns, the model
predicts a larger ratio between the variance in prices and the variance in qualities in the market
that is subject to image concerns.24
In both markets, the set of available qualities is predicted to be the same. But in the image
market, at least the highest quality product is sold at a premium price but the lowest quality
product is not. So the variance in prices goes up. If consumers have homogeneous image
concerns or image concerns and taste for quality are perfectly positively correlated, Prediction
1 still applies.
In the wine market for example, the model would predict that for producers who are better-
known and thereby have a higher signaling value λ, the spread in prices for a given set of
qualities is larger than it is for a less well-known producers offering the same qualities.
Prediction 2. Suppose image concerns are already reflected in the market. Then, an increase
in the value of image, λ, either leads to an increase in prices and a weak increase in qualities
for an unchanged number of products in the line, or the product line becomes shorter and only
prices increase.
In the special case where taste for quality and image concerns are perfectly positively cor-
related, the prediction is simply that an increase in the value of image leads to price changes
whereas the set of available qualities is unaffected.
Prediction 3. Increases in the fraction of image-concerned consumers, whether they are con-
cerned with quality (αs) or not (αn),
(i) trigger the monopolist to reduce quality and increase prices,
(ii) lead to an increase in profits,
(iii) but make individual consumers worse off.
Prediction 4. As the share of quality-concerned consumers (β) increases, the monopolist raises
both quality and prices.
If image concerns and taste for quality are perfectly positively correlated, an increase in
the share of image-concerned consumers leaves the set of available qualities unaffected. In a
model without image concerns, qualities and prices would not react to changes in the fraction of
quality-concerned consumers. Only the market share of high quality products would be affected.
5. Competition
As a product becomes more familiar, more producers can credibly supply any desired quality
level and a monopolistic market becomes less likely. This section illustrates that heterogeneous
image concerns promote product differentiation which is not driven by heterogeneous quality
valuations but by heterogeneous image concerns even in the absence of market power on the
supply side. A crucial difference in a competitive market is, however, that for image concerns
large enough all consumers who value image or quality buy a product with positive quality,
whereas a monopoly would offer an exclusive good which is only bought by consumers who de-
rive utility from both image and quality. Moreover, the mechanisms of separation are different.
24Comparative statics with respect to the value of image can be directly read-off from Table 2.
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Taking the quality level which would be sold in the absence of image concerns as a benchmark,
product differentiation occurs through an additional product with higher quality in the com-
petitive market (upward distortion). In contrast, the monopolist induces separation through an
additional product with lower quality (downward distortion).
5.1. A model of perfect competition
The consumer side is set up exactly as in Section 3. For the supply side, suppose that all
qualities are available at different prices equal to or above the marginal cost of provision, p(s) ≥
c(s) = 12s
2. This captures a situation of competition without actually modeling the interaction
among producers and is more general than assuming zero profits as is often done to model
perfect competition.25 The game reduces to all consumers simultaneously choosing a product
(s, p) ∈M to maximize utility. The set from which they choose is now given as
M =
{
(s, p) ∈ R2|s ≥ 0 and p ≥ 1
2
s2
}
.
An equilibrium is given by consumer choices satisfying Definition 1. Images are formed as
an outside spectator would form them and are consistent with consumers’ actual choices in
equilibrium. This spectator is a virtual second player who moves after consumers and who pays
consumers in the form of image, so that the game resembles a signaling game. The equilibrium
is generally not unique. I therefore rely on a refinement in the spirit of the Intuitive Criterion
by Cho and Kreps (1987).26
5.2. Competitive equilibrium
Note first that consumers who value neither image nor quality never buy any product (s, p) 6=
(0, 0). Furthermore, a consumer who values quality alone will not be influenced by image and
will always buy the product which offers the best deal in terms of quality and price. His utility
is independent of beliefs and maximized at (s, p) = (1, 12) ∈M. Thus, the driving forces behind
the equilibrium outcome are the decisions of the two consumer types who care about image.
Since unconcerned consumers always choose the outside good, the image of not buying is equal
to zero unless any quality-concerned consumer also chooses this option.
Single-product equilibria In general, several competitive equilibria coexist. Consider first
equilibria such that unconcerned consumers do not buy, and all other consumer types pool on
the product (1, 12).
Lemma 6. There exists a partially pooling equilibrium where all consumers who value quality
buy (1, 12) and purely image-concerned consumers randomize between buying (1,
1
2) with proba-
bility q and not buying at all with probability 1− q where
(4) q =

0 if λ < 12
(2λ− 1) βαs(2−β)αn if 12 ≤ λ ≤ 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β
1 otherwise.
25The product design problem is assumed away on purpose in order to better understand how strategic product
design contributes to the results in the monopoly case. The assumption precludes multi-product firms which
could otherwise cross-subsidize products.
26Formally, the model does not have a receiver of signals and therefore is not a proper signaling game. This
refinement is formulated in terms of best responses (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Here, formally no party acts upon
the product choice but the images can be interpreted as a consumer’s perception of an inactive third player’s
belief about his type. Then, the original logic of the refinement applies. See also Gradwohl and Smorodinsky
(2014) for using the Intuitive Criterion in Perception Games.
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The image associated with buying (1, 12) is R(1,
1
2) =
β
q(1−β)αn+β .
In a competitive market, (1, 12) is always available to purely quality-concerned consumers.
Thus, a competitive equilibrium analogous to the exclusive good does not exist. For values of
image up to 12 , the efficient quality level s = 1 is sold at a price equal to marginal cost to all
consumers who care about quality and only to those. Those who do not value quality choose
the outside option. This is the competitive version of the standard good; image does not
manifest itself in changes in quality, price or purchasing behavior. For values of image λ > 12 ,
purchasing the product (1, 12) becomes attractive to purely image-concerned consumers since it
is associated with image R(1, 12) = 1. Thus, the only single-product equilibrium for λ >
1
2 is
one of (partial) mainstreaming where consumers who value image or quality all buy (1, 12).
As purely image-concerned consumers buy (1, 12) with positive probability, the associated image
decreases though. When image becomes valuable enough, consumers who only value image buy
(1, 12) with probability 1 since even the resulting image (which is strictly lower than one) is
worth more than the price of 12 . For intermediate values of image, however, only a fraction
q ∈ (0, 1) of purely image-concerned consumers buys (1, 12).27 In contrast to the monopolistic
mass market where quality would typically be distorted downward, the quality level within any
competitive mainstreaming equilibrium equals the level that would be first best without image
concerns. Moreover, the product is priced at marginal cost, whereas the monopoly charges the
strictly higher monopoly price for quality.
Two-product equilibria It is easy to see that partially separating equilibria must induce a
consumer partition where purely quality-concerned and purely image-concerned consumers pool
on the product (1, 12), consumers who value both quality and image separate from the others
by buying another product (s′, p′), and those who value neither quality nor image choose the
outside option. Suppose to the contrary that consumers who value only quality buy (1, 12)
whereas purely image-concerned consumers and those who value image and quality pool on a
different product (s, p) 6= (1, 12). Then, the image of (s, p) is smaller than 1 due to the purchases
of purely image-concerned consumers. Thus, consumers who value image and quality would be
better off by also purchasing (1, 12) with associated image of 1.
Among the partially separating two-product equilibria, we can distinguish two classes: those
where products are priced at marginal costs and those where prices exceed marginal costs.
Lemma 7. For λ > 12 , we find ε > 0 such that the two products (1,
1
2) and (1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) form
a separating equilibrium with
R
(
1 + ε,
(1 + ε)2
2
)
= 1, R
(
1,
1
2
)
=
β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn , R(0, 0) = 0
where purely image-concerned consumers buy with probability q and
(5) q =
{
(2λ− 1) βαs(1−β)αn if 12 < λ ≤ 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β
1 if λ > 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β
Consumers who value both quality and image buy (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ), a product which provides
a functional excuse while being priced at marginal cost. These consumers use excessive
quality as a way to pay a higher price to signal that they value quality. Purely image-concerned
consumers refrain from imitating them because the price of the high quality product exceeds
the value of the associated image. Instead, they buy (1, 12). This same product is also bought
by consumers who only value quality so that the associated image is positive.
27This type of randomization is consistent with Assumption 1 but never chosen by the monopolist.
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Lemma 8. For λ > 12 , we find s ≥ 1 and η > 0 such that the two products (1, 12) and (s, 12s2 +η)
form a separating equilibrium with
R
(
s,
1
2
s2 + η
)
= 1, R
(
1,
1
2
)
=
β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn , R(0, 0) = 0
where purely image-concerned consumers buy with probability q and
(6) q =
{
(2λ− 1) βαs(1−β)αn if 12 < λ ≤ 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β
1 if λ > 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β
In this type of equilibrium, consumers who value image and quality pay a price premium
above marginal costs to separate from purely image-concerned consumers. It turns out that
this way of separating requires beliefs that are not consistent with a standard refinement.
5.3. Equilibrium refinement
There are generically multiple two-product equilibria. Furthermore, the single-product equi-
librium from Lemma 6 also coexists with the two-product ones. I employ a refinement in the
spirit of the Intuitive Criterion (IC) by Cho and Kreps (1987) to obtain a unique equilibrium
prediction.28 It turns out that the refinement rules out image-premia, i.e. equilibria in which
consumers who value both quality and image buy overpriced products to obtain an image by
spending more money than necessary. Instead they buy excessive quality at marginal cost. Fur-
thermore, it rules out single-product equilibria where purely image-concerned consumers buy
positive quality. Figure 4 illustrates the result.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion is unique. All products are
sold at marginal cost and the equilibrium is
(i) the standard good with (s, p) = (1, 12) if λ ≤ 12 .
(ii) functional excuse with (sL, pL) = (1,
1
2) and (sH , pH) = (1 + ε,
1
2(1 + ε)
2) for ε =√
1 + 2λ q(1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn − 1 if 12 < λ.
In functional excuse, the participation probability of purely image-concerned types is q = (2λ−
1) ((1−αs)β))(αn(1−β)) for
1
2 ≤ λ < 12 (1−αs)β+αn(1−β)(1−αs)β) , and q = 1 otherwise.
The first claim is trivial. For λ < 12 purely image-concerned consumers prefer (0, 0) over
buying the product (1, 12) even when the latter is associated with the best image R(1,
1
2) = 1.
Since the choice of purely quality-concerned consumers is independent of beliefs, the image
associated with product (1, 12) is R(1,
1
2) = 1. Thus, consumers who value image and quality
also choose (1, 12). To prove the second claim, I first rule out all two-product equilibria but
the one that separates at least cost to the consumers. Then, I show that the single-product
equilibrium is inconsistent with the Intuitive Criterion for λ > 12 : Suppose we are in the single-
product equilibrium. There always exists ε > 0 such that a consumer who values both quality
and image profits from deviating to product (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) if he beliefs this to be associated
with R = 1, while purely image-concerned consumers cannot profit from deviating to product
(1+ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) for any belief. Then, the associated image must be R(1+ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) = 1. Otherwise
we would assign positive probability to a type who would never gain from choosing this product.
But then a consumer who values quality and image would always want to deviate.
28As argued in Footnote 26 my model can be interpreted as a signaling game by introducing a third inactive
player. Then, the intuitive criterion applies in the conventional way.
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Figure 4: Competitive equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion.
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λ
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functional excuse
β
β + (1− β)αn
β + (1− β)αs + αsβ
(√
1 +
2αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αsβ − 1
)
Figure 5: Average quality in a competitive market. In the absence of image concerns, average
quality equals β.
If the intensity of image concerns is small, the equilibrium resembles the monopolistic stan-
dard good case: a product with quality s = 1 is bought by all consumers who value qual-
ity. Those who do not value quality pick the outside option, which can be thought of as a
conventional good without any quality component. If the value of image increases, purely
image-concerned consumers are attracted by the same product and thus separation becomes
worthwhile for the consumer who values image and quality. Product differentiation within the
quality segment occurs even though the market is perfectly competitive. Consumers who value
both quality and image are willing to buy excessive quality: they use a functional excuse to
separate from other consumers and obtain higher image. Product differentiation then features
an upward distortion in quality: The lower quality product has quality s = 1 and is bought
by consumers who value either image or quality. The high quality product with s > 1 is not
attractive for the purely image-concerned consumers due to its high price even at marginal cost
pricing.29
Proposition 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium as a function of the value of image λ.
From this, one can compute average quality in the market. Figure 5 illustrates that the average
quality level, which depends on the qualities sold to consumers as well as on the fractions of
consumers who buy a given quality, is increasing in the value of image λ.
In contrast to the monopoly case, the prevalence of different equilibria is unaffected by changes
in the preference distribution since the threshold between standard good and functional excuse
is independent of the preference distribution. Moreover, changes in the frequencies of consumer
types affect products and purchases only if consumers behave according to functional excuse
and purely image-concerned consumers purchase (1, 12) with probability one. As long as purely
image-concerned consumers randomize over choosing (0, 0) and buying (1, 12), the products
in functional excuse are independent of the preference distribution. Trivially, products and
purchases do not depend on the preference distribution in standard good either.
29This result relies on the additivity of utility from image and quality. The convex cost of quality production
exceeds the value of quality for every quality level above one and only consumers who in addition realize
image utility are willing to pay the price.
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5.4. Testable predictions
Prediction 5. In a competitive market, (i) average quality is (weakly) higher than in monopoly,
and (ii) average quality increases in the value of image λ.
In contrast, in a model where image concerns are not taken into account, are assumed to be
homogeneous across individuals, or perfectly positively correlated with tastes for quality, we
would not predict average quality to be higher in a competitive setting than in monopoly.
Prediction 6. In a competitive market, average quality increases in αs and αn and is non-
monotone in β.
In a model without image concerns, only an increase in β is predicted to trigger an increase
in average quality due to an enlarged market share for the high-quality product.30
6. Welfare analysis
Since image cannot be allocated independently of quality (it depends on equilibrium behavior),
even a welfare maximizer would be bound to trade off efficiency in allocating image versus
efficiency in allocating quality. Moreover, the partition of consumers determines how much
image in total is allocated in the market. Since prices are an instrument to enforce a partition,
they are not welfare neutral in market-based allocations.
6.1. Welfare-maximizing allocations
The analysis of profit-maximizing behavior focused on consumer partitions that can be sus-
tained by incentive-compatible product lines. As the welfare-maximizing partition may not be
incentive-compatible, more partitions have to be considered. In total, the four types of con-
sumers can be grouped in 15 different ways. For the welfare analysis, I have analyzed all of
these partitions. First, I identify the quality levels that maximize welfare for a given partition.
Second, I compare welfare across partitions. The welfare measure is the aggregate consumer
utility31 generated by the quality allocations minus the cost of producing the respective quality
levels.
Proposition 4. Welfare is maximized by providing quality as if image concerns were absent if
λ ≤ 12 . If λ > 12 , welfare is maximized by providing zero quality to consumers who value neither
quality nor image, swL =
(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) to consumers who value either quality or image, and
swH = 1 to consumers who value both quality and image.
Corollary 3. Quality swL is independent of the value of image, λ. The monopolist underprovides
quality to purely image-concerned consumers and to purely quality-concerned consumers, smL <
swL , for λ < 1, and overprovides it, s
m
L > s
w
L , for λ > 1.
Corollary 4. The competitive market implements the welfare optimum for λ ≤ 12 . For λ > 12 ,
the competitive market, overprovides quality to all consumers but those who value neither image
nor quality, i.e. swL < s
c
L and s
w
H < s
c
H .
30Prediction 5 can be directly read off from Figures 3 and 5. The formal result behind Prediction 6 is proved in
Appendix B.1.
31Note that in this special case with σL = ρL = 0, utility of unconcerned consumers equals zero. The results
generalizes easily to σL > 0.
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6.2. When does monopoly yield higher welfare than competition?
Even though the monopolist does not in general implement the welfare maximizing allocation,
competition does in general not do better. The reason is that the monopolist can stabilize
separation through its pricing while consumers use excessive quality to separate in competition.
The former often yields higher welfare. For instance, monopoly yields higher welfare than
competition if half of the population values quality, half is concerned with their image, the image
concern is independent of the taste for quality, and image and quality are weighed equally in
the utility function.
Proposition 5. There generically exist parameters such that monopoly yields higher welfare
than competition.
Proof. The proof is by example.
Example 2. Suppose λ = 1, β = 0.5, αn = 0.5, and αs = 0.5. Then λ˜m = .5 < λ < 6 =
˜˜
λm.
Welfare in monopoly, which yields image building, is 0.5625 whereas welfare in competition,
which yields functional excuse, is 0.478553.
Welfare in monopoly is continuous in λ for λ /∈ {λ˜m, ˜˜λm} and in competition for λ 6= 12 . Thus,
we find parameter constellations close to the example such that welfare with monopoly is still
higher than welfare with competition.
The result from Proposition 5 that the competitive market outcome may lead to lower welfare
than monopoly does not depend on the refinement used in the competitive setting, and it does
not depend on the equilibrium selection in monopoly either (see Appendix B.6 and B.7).
When competition leads to higher welfare than monopoly, it also leads to higher consumer
surplus than monopoly. But even if competition reduces welfare, consumers may still profit.
Whether consumers are better off in competition or monopoly depends on the consumer type
and the product line offered by the monopolist.
Corollary 5. Consumers who value quality always benefit from competition but there exist
parameters such that consumers who value only image are better off in monopoly.
Corollary 6. If the monopolist offers an image building product line, all consumer types would
be (weakly) better off in a competitive market.
6.3. A minimum quality standard decreases and a luxury tax increases welfare
The model allows for the analysis of some common policy measures. The introduction of a
minimum quality standard (MQS), which is intended to ensure that all consumers get a high
quality product, can hurt consumers. With a binding minimum quality standard, the monopolist
has to adjust the low quality upwards and the price for high quality downwards to achieve
product differentiation; this benefits consumers. However, since the adjustments make product
differentiation less profitable, the monopolist will resort to an exclusive good or standard good
regime for a larger set of parameters. Due to this change in equilibrium, quality regulation can
trigger decreases in consumer surplus and in welfare.
Proposition 6. There exist parameters such that the introduction of a binding minimum quality
standard in a monopolistic market decreases consumer surplus and welfare.
A minimum quality standard as analyzed for the monopoly case does not bite in competition
because qualities are already upward distorted. However, if product differentiation prevails
under competition, a tax on higher qualities can improve welfare. By increasing consumer
prices above marginal costs, it allows consumers to achieve a high image at lower qualities
which can be produced more efficiently.
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Proposition 7. In competition, we can design a luxury tax on excessive quality such that welfare
strictly increases.
This finding mirrors the results in e.g. Ireland (1994) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) that
taxation improves welfare in the presence of image or status concerns but in a very different
model. In Ireland (1994), the tax corrects a problem of overconsumption by increasing the price
of the good so that all consumption levels are shifted downwards without affecting the sorting
of consumers. Here, the tax only affects the high quality product thereby shifting the separat-
ing equilibrium from one in which quality differences ensure separation to one where (mostly)
price differences ensure separation. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) analyze a consumption tax
in the form of a Pigouvian tax that corrects the status externality. However, the optimal tax in
their model depends on a consumer’s income whereas in my model, a tax on certain qualities is
sufficient to improve welfare. It is important to note, that in my model the tax does not nec-
essarily constitute a Pareto improvement without further redistributive measures. Consumers
who value quality and image might be worse off with a luxury tax than without it because the
tax might exceed the private gain from regulation. The private gain is given by the reduction
in price(=marginal cost) corrected for the reduction in quality.32
Whereas in a standard model without image concerns, all consumers would profit from the
market becoming more competitive, my model predicts that consumers are differently affected.
Moreover, the mentioned policy measures affect market participants differently. To investigate
this in detail, one would need data about consumer satisfaction and purchasing motivations for
a period where a market with image concerns becomes more competitive. Consumer surveys
may be a reasonable source.
7. Extensions and robustness
7.1. Generalizing types
The main analysis concentrates on the simplified case with σL = ρL = 0 for two reasons. One is
tractability but the more important one is that this simplification prevents quality distortions in
the benchmark model without image concerns because the low quality valuation type is always
excluded. If I modify the model such that σL > 0, the decision whether or not to exclude any
consumer type becomes more delicate. Still, the results from before go through qualitatively:
For low image concern, the product line looks the same as if image concerns were absent: two
quality levels are offered. For intermediate image concerns, three different quality levels are
offered, and consumers who have a low quality valuation and care about image pool with those
who have a high valuation and do not value image on the product of intermediate quality. For
high image concerns, two quality levels are sold, one exclusively to those who value image and
quality, the other one to all other consumers.
These qualitative results are modified in that any type of product line as derived in the
main analysis exists in two versions: one where consumers with the lowest willingness to pay
are excluded, so that the product of lowest quality is (0, 0), and one where they are served a
product of positive quality, where the product of lowest quality is (sL, pL) 6= (0, 0). Whether
the product intended for the lowest type is equal to the outside option or not depends on the
distribution of preferences, σL and σH but it does not depend on the strength of image concerns,
λ, and exclusion does not need to occur.33
32The social gain is positive. A reduction in quality moves the quality level closer to first best and thereby
narrows the gap between the consumers quality valuation and marginal cost. The quality valuation minus
marginal cost of quality is negative since image concerns induce the consumer to choose a quality that is
greater than what is first best without image concerns.
33Supplementary material regarding this generalization is available upon request. For the review process, the
respective files have been included in the submission as supplementary material.
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7.2. Heterogeneity in wealth
If consumers do not differ in intrinsic quality preferences but in wealth and desire to signal
wealth rather than quality preferences, the model can be directly interpreted that way. In
this reinterpretation, a higher willingness to pay for quality is a signal of wealth not quality
preferences. While the model has been framed as one in which consumers have different tastes
for quality which they want to signal, there is a dual interpretation in which consumers are
heterogeneous in wealth and want to signal their wealth to other consumers. Heterogeneous
tastes for quality in the indirect utility functions of the presented model can be derived from
direct utility functions with identical reservation prices but income heterogeneity (see e.g. Peitz,
1995). In this setting, consumers with higher income (or higher wealth) value quality more.
Put differently, the taste parameter σ in the indirect utility representation is a measure of the
marginal intrinsic utility from quality relative to the marginal value of money.
If consumers were interested in signaling the compound of taste and income, the model itself
would not have to change. However, the screening problem in which consumers also differ in
their signaling motivation becomes potentially much more complicated because the compound
of the two motivations can take on more than two different values. But this modification is likely
to again yield partial pooling in equilibrium. The underlying intuition is the same as before:
consumers with relatively high intrinsic motivation and wealth but with low image concern
provide positive externalities to consumers with high image concern but relatively low intrinsic
motivation and wealth such that surplus can be increased by pooling these types.
The problem becomes more complicated if instead the inferences regarding taste for quality
and wealth enter utility with opposite signs. Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) analyze a related
problem in which agents choose their degree of prosocial behavior in the presence of image
concerns and monetary incentives. In contrast to their setting, my paper focuses on a strategic
supplier who interferes with the signal space. Providing a formal extension that incorporates the
signal jamming intuition from Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) is beyond the scope of this paper.34
Let me nonetheless provide some intuition on how inferences in my model would be affected by
additional wealth heterogeneity. If intrinsic taste for quality and income are perfectly positively
correlated, the dimensionality of the model remains the same but the spread in valuations
increases. If the correlation is positive but imperfect, the image of having a high taste for quality
associated with the purchase of a high quality product is diluted by the wealth confound but
the basic intuitions of the model will still apply because purchasing higher quality remains a
signal of having a high taste for quality. However, if the correlation between wealth and intrinsic
taste for quality is negative, the inference about intrinsic preferences from purchases becomes
increasingly blurred by wealth differences. In the extreme case of a perfect negative correlation,
those with low intrinsic interest but high wealth may have the highest willingness to pay for
quality and therefore, ceteris paribus, buy the highest quality product. If consumers care about
being perceived as intrinsically interested in quality, such a situation would resemble one in
which purchasing a high quality product is stigmatized (cf. Section 7.4). Those who care about
their image are deterred from buying the high quality because the associated image is worse
than the one of buying lower quality or not buying at all because the less wealthy who value
quality cannot afford high quality. In such a situation, the monopolist will try and pool the
wealthy with the quality-concerned consumers by lowering the price accordingly.
A simple way to capture the intuition from additional wealth heterogeneity, without explicitly
modeling it, is to interpret λ as the product of the informativeness of the purchasing decision
with respect to taste and the value of the social image as such. If the distribution of wealth and
tastes are not aligned, a purchase is not very informative about tastes and thus, the realized
utility from image is low, and vice versa.
34Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) provide a solution for their model under the assumption that valuations are normally
distributed and image concerns are independent from intrinsic motivation. The problem becomes significantly
more complicated by introducing a strategic producer and by letting go of independence.
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I find a different approach much more relevant though: If a consumer population is hetero-
geneous with respect to the three dimensions quality preferences, wealth, and image concern,
the producer could differentiate its products in two quality dimensions, one that appeals to the
intrinsic quality valuation and one that targets wealth alone. We observe this for instance in the
car market, where different categories of cars target wealth but within each category cars differ
in how environmentally friendly they are. Thus, the manufacturer also screens with respect to
sustainability preferences. The formal analysis of optimally screening along multiple dimensions
(other than image concerns) is again beyond the scope of this paper. See for instance Ketelaar
and Szalay (2014) for recent progress in this direction.
7.3. Stigmatization of consumers with low quality concern
The analysis assumes that consumers derive positive utility from being considered as those who
have a high taste for quality. An alternative possibility is that consumers experience negative
utility from being considered as having a low taste for quality. The latter view is one of social
pressure to which individuals want to conform. A modified model that includes the social
pressure interpretation gives exactly the same predictions (see Appendix B.4). The welfare
analysis, however, depends on the frame. Whereas higher visibility of behavior, reflected in a
higher λ, increases consumer utility and welfare in the positive social image frame, consumer
utility and welfare decrease in λ in the social pressure frame. If the mechanism at work is indeed
social pressure, consumers may profit from policies that hinder inferences about individuals’
purchasing motivations, for instance restrictions in the variety of products being sold.
7.4. High interest in quality is stigmatized
Suppose the model is as laid out in the monopolistic case in Section 4 but now image decreases
utility, λ < 0. Being recognized as a consumer who values quality gives a negative image and this
image is more negative the better identified consumers preferences are from their consumption
choice. Examples are goods where quality has a strong negative externality and its consumption
is therefore seen as morally unacceptable. Imagine a preference for big, polluting cars. Being
aware of the fact that showing this preference gives a negative image is likely to influence
purchasing behavior and thus should also be reflected in the marketing strategy of the producer.
Another way to interpret a negative value of image would be a social norm against showing off.
Consumers might still value good quality but at the same time dislike being identified as those
who are rich enough to afford it. For instance, showing a taste for expensive jewelry can lead to
reduced status in a neighborhood where equality is valued above all. The Scandinavian Jante
Law describes a pattern of group behavior consistent with this interpretation.
Proposition 8. Suppose image exhibits a negative effect on utility.
(i) For λ < −12αs only types who care about quality but not about image buy quality s = 1 at
monopoly price p = 1.
(ii) For λ ≥ −12αs both types who care about quality buy quality s = 1 at price p = 1 + λ < 1
below the conventional monopoly price.
If quality is associated with stigma, the monopolist either reduces the price of quality or
accepts to sell to fewer consumers than in the absence of image concerns. For small negative
image concerns, the stigma of being interested in quality implies a lower price. Consumers
who are indifferent with respect to image concerns profit from the existence of image-concerned
consumers through a lower price for both of them. For stronger negative image concerns, those
who care about image choose the outside option. In this case, the product sold is identical to
the one offered in the absence of image concerns.
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7.5. Differing views on what gives a good image
An alternative view would not interpret image as a means of vertical dimension but instead take
an identity perspective, where consumers are located on different value positions and try to find
a product which matches their identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In a version of my model
in which consumers derive utility from signaling their preference for quality instead of following
a common norm of what is “good” behavior, the set of profitable product lines changes as
compared to the preceding analysis. Pooling on a positive quality level does not occur anymore.
Instead, the monopolist offers two products at opposite quality levels and charges an image
premium on both of them.
7.6. Quality as a public good
Extending the application to ethical consumption, we can interpret the purchase of quality as
a private contribution to a public good as in Besley and Ghatak (2007). The monopolistic
producer bundles the private consumption good with a contribution to the public good by
engaging in responsible production methods. These are interpreted as quality here. Some
consumers experience warm glow utility from purchasing the good with the bundled contribution
(for warm glow see Andreoni, 1990). Some experience utility from being seen as contributors
(image utility). No-one, however, takes into account that his individual purchase has an impact
on the aggregate level of provision of the public good.
In general, efficient provision will not be reached with monopoly. Provision in the competitive
market is typically higher than in monopoly but not in general at the efficient level either. The
reason for this result is of course that—in contrast to the socially efficient level of provision—the
market-based provision of quality is independent of the social value of quality. This finding is
also evident in Figures 3 and 5: If the social value per unit of quality is γ, the socially efficient
provision level is β + γ which is constant in λ but in general different from the market-based
levels of provision. Still, under some conditions image concerns can help to move aggregate
consumption of quality closer to the optimum so that the pessimistic perspective of Frank
(2005) on positional goods might have to be reconsidered.35
For products which have a public good character like Fairtrade or organic production, non-
governmental organizations may try to “raise awareness” to foster their cause. However, “raising
awareness” may, depending on its meaning, have unintended consequences. First, raising aware-
ness can mean that public recognition increases and therefore the value of image, λ, increases.
Second, raising awareness can mean that the number of intrinsically motivated consumers, β,
increases. Finally, it can mean that the fraction of consumers who value image - αs, αn, whether
or not they value quality - increases. At first sight, one might guess that all effects go in the
same direction since they all increase the population-wide willingness-to-pay for quality. As has
been shown in Corollary 2, however, this intuition is wrong; increases in image concerns can
decrease the provision of quality.
8. Discussion of existing and new insights
8.1. Conspicuous consumption and status seeking in economic theory
The idea that individuals engage in consumption conspicuously goes back at least to Veblen
(1915). While Becker’s (1974) analysis of the influence of social interactions can be applied to
understand status concerns in consumer behavior, Frank (1985) provides a more explicit formal
35Frank (2005) discusses how “positional externalities cause large and preventable welfare losses” by inducing
people to spend too much. In my paper, images lead to positional externalities and quality is a positional
good in the sense of Frank (2005). If image motivated spending helps to provide a public good, it is not pure
waste of resources anymore and welfare effects become more complex.
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analysis of how status seeking behavior affects the consumption of observable and unobservable
goods. Since then, several studies have presented theoretical analyses of the distorting forces
of status seeking behavior on patterns of consumption (Ireland, 1994; Bagwell and Bernheim,
1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997).36 In line with these approaches, I model images as signals
about a consumer’s type. There is, however, also a strand in the literature that models the
conspicuousness of a good as a consumption externality that depends only on the number of
consumers (e.g. Buehler and Halbheer, 2012). Within this class of papers, some authors distin-
guish snobs who prefer to consume in a small group and followers who gain utility when more
others consume the same product (Leibenstein, 1950; Amaldoss and Jain, 2011; Tereyagoglu
and Veeraraghavan, 2012). Corneo and Jeanne (1997) show that the signaling approach is more
general as a follower and a snob effect (Leibenstein, 1950) emerge endogenously.
Despite the length and breadth of this literature, only few studies analyze production and
pricing decisions of strategic firms facing a population of conspicuous consumers. To the best
of my knowledge, only in the model by Rayo (2013) the producer decides about a product
line to profit from image concerns. Rayo (2013) extends a Mussa-Rosen type model of quality
provision to allow for heterogeneous image concerns. In contrast to my model, he assumes
that marginal utility from quality and image are proportional to each other which simplifies
the monopolist’s problem to a one-dimensional screening problem. The distortions in quality
provision are identical to those well-known from the literature and image concerns influence
solely the pricing schedule. Pooling occurs if and only if the monopolist’s marginal revenue
function is somewhere decreasing in consumer type.37 My model illustrates a different reason
for pooling, namely that marginal utilities in both dimensions are not aligned.38
Vikander (2011) allows for strategic producer behavior in a different way: keeping the product
line fixed, he analyzes how a firm optimally chooses its advertising strategy to maximize profit
from a population that differs in wealth and cares about status. Mazali and Rodrigues-Neto
(2013) analyze how many different brands a monopolist wants to provide if consumers differ in
ability that they want to signal to potential match partners. In their paper, brands are pure
status goods and the focus is on the effect of fixed development costs. In addition, several papers
focus on rationing strategies that foster status through artificial scarcity when consumers care
about reference group effects (Amaldoss and Jain, 2008, 2010).39 These models do not allow
the producer to offer multiple quality-differentiated products. Moreover, Amaldoss and Jain
(2008, 2010) distinguish consumers who are leaders and can purchase first from those who are
followers, observe behavior, and desire to emulate leaders. Thus, the characteristics that identify
a leader have to be observable.40 Here, I am interested in second-degree price discrimination
when consumers desire to signal an unobservable trait like taste, wealth, or prosociality so that
this paper is complementary to those analyses.
The monopolist in my paper is designing a product line to influence how consumers sort into
groups by purchasing different products. The products are associated with different images
that are derived from the types of consumers who purchase them. Relatedly, Board (2009)
investigates how a firm designs groups by setting a menu of access prices when agents care
about peer effects and can self-select into their preferred group. One way to specify the peer
effect is as the conditional expectation of an agent’s type in a given group. An agent’s utility
36Status seeking behavior has also been analysed as a motivation for charitable giving, a special variant of
consumption (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 1998a,b).
37This corresponds to a violation of the often made assumption that the hazard rate of the type distribution is
increasing. Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) discuss this phenomenon as “bunching and ironing” (p. 88ff).
38Note the similarity to a bundling problem. If the correlation between the individual valuations for the two
commodities or dimensions are not too strongly positive, bundling is the optimal strategy for the monopolist
(e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004, p. 210).
39Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan (2012) show that a firm may create scarcity by using an expensive source to
commit to a low production volume.
40In a similar spirit, Kircher and Postlewaite (2008) analyze how consumer emulation leads firms to treat better-
informed consumers better than others.
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from the peer effect and his marginal contribution to the peer effect are assumed to be perfectly
correlated. The paper offers interesting results on the way the peer technology and cost of group
formation affect the optimal group structure and how it differs from the market outcome. In this
paper, I am instead interested in quality decisions in the presence of a particular type of peer
effect. Moreover, I am particularly interested in the consequences of an imperfect correlation
between an agent’s valuation of the peer effect, here the image concern, and his contribution to
this peer effect as given by his taste for quality.
In contrast to classic conspicuous consumption models in which consumers signal their wealth
by adjusting their purchased quantity freely (Ireland, 1994; Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Corneo
and Jeanne, 1997), I assume unit demand. Thus, the effect of image concerns shows up in
inefficient quality levels whereas status concerned consumers buy inefficient quantities in the
classic setup. If image is not related to wealth but to other traits, however, signaling via
quantity is unreasonable. Moreover, I assume that consumers also differ in their image concern
and not only in their taste for quality as is the case in the classic models.
The utility function in my model is similar to the one used in Bernheim (1994) where intrinsic
utility and image also enter utility additively. Apart from that, the models differ substantially.
Bernheim (1994) assumes a continuous distribution over intrinsic preferences and imposes a
homogeneous interest in status. In contrast, I work with only two different values for intrinsic
preferences but with heterogeneous interests in image. Moreover, the focus of the analysis
in Bernheim (1994) is how concerns for social esteem influence consumers’ actions in a setup
where the action space of consumers is unrestricted. The main point of my analysis is how
the supply side reacts to consumers’ status concerns and how it manipulates the signaling
possibilities in the market. It thereby sheds light on a hitherto underresearched aspect of
conspicuous consumption. Following Bernheim (1994) more closely, it would be an interesting
further question to analyze institutional design in the presence of status concerns and conformity.
In this line, for instance Daughety and Reinganum (2010) analyze when contributions to a public
good should be observable or unobservable if agents are subject to social pressure.
8.2. Relation to (two-dimensional) screening models
My model also contributes to the literature on two-dimensional screening as it adds a second
degree of preference heterogeneity to a conspicuous consumption model. Types are binary in
both dimensions as in Armstrong and Rochet (1999). But in contrast to their paper, image as
the additional product characteristic cannot be chosen freely in my model but product images
must be consistent with consumers’ purchasing choices so that already the first-best solutions
of the models differ. By designing the product line, the monopolist influences which images
are available in the market. As a consequence, pooling occurs generically and for reasons
different from the bunching condition in existing (multi-dimensional) screening models (Rochet
and Chone´, 1998). Due to the heterogeneity in image concerns, allocating image is not a zero-
sum game anymore. Pooling is a tool to create value in the form of image to consumer types
who value image but who by themselves do not contribute to a positive image. Several consumer
types may bunch on the outside option, that is exclusion might involve pooling, but pooling
also occurs on products with positive qualities. While exclusion is of additional interest in
multi-dimensional models, the main analysis in my paper uses a setup, where exclusion occurs
by design. As the lower valuations have been set to zero, the lowest type will never find it
optimal to buy a product with a positive price and therefore will never be sold a product with
positive quality. In the generalized model with σH > σL > 0, exclusion occurs endogenously
(see Section 7.1).
A main result of the paper is that the monopolist reacts to image concern by offering a
product of inferior quality in addition to its regular product line. This finding is reminiscent of
the argument by Deneckere and McAfee (1996) that producers may segment a market by offering
a damaged version in addition to the regular product. In Deneckere and McAfee (1996), the
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damaged product is more costly to produce than the high quality product so that the prediction
that producers actually damage parts of their production is striking. In my model, the decrease
in quality comes with a cost reduction to the producers and is thus less surprising. But in
contrast to Deneckere and McAfee (1996) (which is itself closely related to the typical downward
distortions found in screening models as for instance Mussa and Rosen, 1978), the intuition
behind lowering the quality is different here. The product with lower quality compromises on
quality to save production costs: The quality is chosen such that its value does not exceed
that of the image because the price of the lower quality product cannot exceed the value of
the associated image. On the other hand, pooling purely image-concerned with purely quality-
concerned consumers “damages” the image associated with the lower quality product so as to
keep it unattractive for those who care about image and quality.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze quality provision and prices under the assumption that individuals differ
in their valuation of quality as well as in their interest in social image. Assuming that consumers
can derive utility from the quality of a product and the social image attached to it, I derive
the optimal product line offered by a monopolist for any combination of the relative frequencies
of four types of consumers and compare it to a perfectly competitive market with respect to
welfare and quality provision.
When image concerns are sufficiently strong, the profit-maximizing product line is distorted to
take consumers’ signaling desire into account. Even though not justified by heterogeneous tastes
for quality, different quality levels can be sold in equilibrium to accommodate heterogeneous
image concerns. By introducing a low quality product, the monopolist creates value in the form
of the associated image and thereby manages to sell to more consumers at higher prices. In a
competitive market, consumers’ image concerns also induce differentiated product purchases.
In contrast to the monopoly case, consumers use excessive quality as a functional excuse to
separate from others and improve their image. The competitive outcome of separation via
excessive quality is less efficient than separation in monopoly via strategic product line design.
Therefore, welfare is higher in monopoly than in competition for generic sets of parameters.
Contrary to what one might expect, image concerns do not always increase the provision
of quality. Instead, the monopolist caters to image concerns by increasing prices for those
consumers who are willing to pay a premium for the image in addition to the price for quality.
To charge as high an image premium as possible on the highest quality product, the producer
may either offer a low quality alternative and thus depress average quality or reduce the market
to an exclusive high-price product. Thus, if quality is considered a public good, as seems
reasonable when we talk about quality as representing working standards, environmentally
friendly production methods, or other components of CSR, image concerns can be detrimental.
If advertising these causes or campaigns which are intended to raise awareness do not increase
consumers’ intrinsic interest but raise only their image concerns, such publicity campaigns can
induce a reduction in the aggregate provision of the public good. Under competition, however,
quality provision never decreases when image concerns increase. Even though competition leads
to higher average consumption of quality, welfare may be lower than in monopoly if the cost of
providing quality and the utility provided in form of image are taken into account.
The predictions for the monopoly case in my model depend on tastes for quality and im-
age concerns are correlated. However, little research has investigated heterogeneity in image
concerns. In related work (Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2013), we find evidence for a nega-
tive relationship between intrinsic motivation and image concerns in Fairtrade consumption.
Results in other studies, discussed above, also point toward negative correlations between the
two motivations in the context of luxury consumption, organic purchases, financial investing,
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and tax evasion. This underlines the empirical relevance of the most interesting image building
equilibrium. It corresponds to a masstige strategy as discussed in the marketing literature.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
In the proofs, I refer to unconcerned consumers as type 00, to purely image-concerned consumers
as type 01, to purely quality-concerned consumers as type 10, and to consumers who value both
quality and image as type 11. In the one-dimensional benchmarks, type 0 refers to consumers
with σ = 0 and type 1 to consumers with σ = 1. Non-participation corresponds to the product
(0, 0), the image of which might be positive. I index images, qualities, and prices within a
product line by L and H to indicate that these values belong to, respectively, the ‘low’ and
‘high’ product, where the ranking is based on the image. To simplify notation define λ1 :=
αn(1−β)+β
β and λ2 :=
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β .
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose the monopolist offers M ⊂ R2≥0. Denote by (s, p)∗ the product in M which
maximizes s− p. Assume without loss of generality that the maximizer is unique.41 Then type
10 buys this product. Note that unconcerned consumers who do value neither quality nor image,
41If there were two maximizers (s, p) 6= (s′, p′), in the consumption stage two equilibria exist where consumers
behave as if (s, p) or (s′, p′) was the unique maximizer of s − p and ignore the other one. Possibly the
consumption stage has mixed strategy equilibria in addition. Note, however, that the monopolist is always
better off including only one of the two products in the product line, namely the one that yields a higher
profit margin p− 1
2
s2.
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σ = ρ = 0 decide not to buy from the monopolist for any positive price. Thus, non-participation
(0, 0) always occurs in equilibrium and its image is restricted by Bayes’ rule.
Let beliefs be such that R(s, p) = 0 for all (s, p) ∈M with (s, p) 6= (s, p)∗ and R((s, p)∗) > 0.
Then, (s, p)∗ = bM(10) = bM(11). Furthermore, (0, 0) = bM(00).
Finally,
bM(01) =

(0, 0) if λ < R((s, p)∗)−1p
∈ {(0, 0), (s, p)∗} if λ = R((s, p)∗)−1p
(s, p)∗ if λ > R((s, p)∗)−1p
I distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Suppose (s, p)∗ 6= (0, 0). Then, for λ < ββ+αn(1−β) and for λ > 1, a pure strategy
equilibrium in the consumer game exists. For λ < ββ+αn(1−β) , types 10 and 11 buy (s, p)
∗ and
type 00 and 01 do not buy. For λ > 1, types 10, 11, and 01 buy (s, p)∗ and type 00 does not buy.
For ββ+αn(1−β) ≤ λ ≤ 1, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, where types 10, 11 and fraction q
of type 01 buy. Type 00 and fraction (1− q) of type 01 do not buy. The mixing probability is
given by q = (λ−p)βpαn(1−β) .
Case 2: Suppose (s, p)∗ = (0, 0). Then, the consumption stage has a pure strategy equilib-
rium in which no consumer buys but all choose (0, 0).
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose the monopolist offers a separating contract and that given this contract the
preferred equilibrium of the monopolist is played. Due to separation R1 = 1 and R0 = 0.
In analogy to the case without image concerns, by profit maximization type 0’s participation
constraint and type 1’s incentive compatibility constraint bind: p0 = 0 · s0 + λR0 = 0 and
p1 = 1 · s1 − (1− 0)s0 + λ(R1 −R0) = s1 − s0 + λ.
The maximization problem becomes
max
s0,s1
β(s1 − s0 + λ− 1
2
s21) + (1− β)(−
1
2
s20).
Taking derivatives and observing that quality cannot be negative gives
β(1− s1) = 0⇒ s∗1 = 1 and − β − (1− β)s0 < 0⇒ s∗0 = 0.
Prices are p∗1 = 1 + λ and p∗0 = 0. It is easily seen that the participation constraint of type
1 and the incentive compatibility constraint of type 0 are fulfilled at these values. The profit
corresponding to the separating product line is ΠS = β2 +βλ > 0. Profit decreases with imperfect
separation since then consumers of type 1 do not buy, the image of non-participation becomes
positive, and therefore those who do buy pay less.
Suppose there is full pooling, i.e. the same product (s, p) 6= (0, 0) is bought by all consumers.
The participation constraint of type 0 is the strictest and thus binds: p = 0 ·s+λ(β1+(1−β)0−
R0) = λ(β − R0). Since the outside good is chosen only out of equilibrium, the consumption
stage has a continuum of equilibria with associated images R0 = E[σ|(0, 0)] ∈ [0, β]. Obviously,
the monopolist’s profit from pooling is largest for R0 = 0. In this case profit maximization gives
s∗ = 0 and p∗ = βλ. The corresponding profit is ΠP = βλ < ΠS . The equilibrium offer is
separating. If non-participation is associated with higher image out of equilibrium, profits will
be even lower and thus pooling is not optimal.42
42Note that after the separating contract has been offered, there is another equilibrium in the consumer game.
High type consumers could collectively deviate to buying the lower quality thereby realizing higher utility
since then R(0, 0) = β. Since the monopolist would in this case make zero profits, offering this product line
cannot be optimal for the monopolist so that I do not have to consider it further. The same argument applies
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Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that the monopolist offers (sP , pP ) to types 01 and 11, a different
product (s10, p10)) and types 10 and 00 choose (0, 0).
Then, R(0, 0) = β(1−αs)(1−β)(1−αn)+β(1−αs) , whereas the product (sP , pP )—chosen by consumers
of types 11 and 01—has R(sP , pP ) =
βαs
(1−β)αn+βαs . The maximum price sP is determined by
type 01’s participation constraint, λR(sP , pP ) − pP ≥ R(0, 0). If this is fulfilled, type 11’s
participation constraint is automatically fulfilled. Thus, pP = λ(R(sP , pP ) − R(0, 0)) and the
optimal prize is independent of quality. Since quality is costly, the monopolist sets sP = 0
and profit from pooling types 01 and 11 is at most Π∗ = (βαs + (1 − β)αn)λ( βαs(1−β)αn+βαs −
β(1−αs)
(1−β)(1−αn)+β(1−αs)). Selling instead only to type 11 allows to sell (s, p) = (1, 1 +λ(1−
β(1−αs)
1−αsβ )
and obtain profits ΠE = βαs(1 +λ(1− β(1−αs)1−αsβ )− 12). Profit from only selling to type 11 strictly
dominates profits from the offer that pools type 01 and 11:
ΠE −Π∗ > αsβ
2
− αsβλβ(1− αs)
1− αsβ + (βαs + (1− β)αn)λ
β(1− αs)
1− αsβ
=
αsβ
2
+ (1− β)αnλβ(1− αs)
1− αsβ > 0
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. I first prove that the monopolist will offer at most two products different from the non-
participation option. Remember that for expositional reasons the latter, (0, 0) is always part
of the product line M. Second, I exclude all but four partitions of consumers on products as
inconsistent with profit maximization in Lemma A2. Third, I derive the prices and qualities
which maximize the monopolist’s profit subject to the corresponding incentive compatibility
and participation constraints given each of the four partitions in Lemmas A3 to A6. For ease of
exposition I introduce the names for the equilibrium candidates already in Lemma A2. Later,
these names refer only to the equilibrium candidates which remain in Proposition 1.
Lemma A1. The monopolist offers at most 2 products and non-participation (0, 0).
Proof. Suppose the monopolist offers (0, 0), (sL, pL), (sH , pH), where (sL, pL) 6= (sH , pH) and
both are different from non-participation. Suppose further there is a pure-strategy equilibrium
in the consumer game, where type 00 takes (0, 0), type 10 and 01 take (sL, pL), and type 11
takes (sH , pH) and profit is maximal in the set of 2 product lines with voluntary participation.
I show (by contradiction) that the monopolist cannot increase profits by offering a third (non-
zero) product (s′, p′) /∈ {(sL, pL), (sH , pH)}. By Corollary 4 a product line with 3 products and
non-participation involves randomization of at least one consumer type and (partial) pooling.
Type 00 always takes (0, 0).
(i) Suppose a single type σρ ∈ {01, 10, 11} randomizes over (s′, p′) and his original choice.
Type 01 alone would not buy (s′, p′) because it has zero image. Type 10 or 11 only randomizes
if s′ − p′ = si − pi for i = L,H, respectively. But if (s′, p′) gives higher per unit profit, the
original offer was not optimal.
(ii) Suppose types 11 and 10 buy (s′, p′). Then, R(s′, p′) = R(sH , pH) = 1. For type 10 it
must hold that pL−p′ = sL−s′, for type 11 pH−p′ = sH−s′. These imply pH = pL+(sH−sL).
The participation constraint of type 10, pL ≤ sL, yields pH ≤ sH and p′ ≤ s′. At the profit
maximum both bind and quality is s′ = sH . But then p′ = pH .
to equilibria where only a fraction of consumers coordinates. I discuss contracts which are robust against
consumer coordination in Appendix B.7.
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(iii) Suppose (s′, p′) is bought by types 11 and 01. Then p′ ≤ R(s′, p′) and profit would
increase if type 10 bought (s′, p′) too to increase the feasible price R(s′, p′) (see Lemma A2).
This does not maximize profits either as shown in Lemma A8.
(iv) Suppose types 10 and 01 buy (s′, p′) and thus R(s′, p′) ∈ (0, 1). Assume that R(s′, p′) >
R(sL, pL). Then, incentive compatibility and profit maximization yield sL = min{λ(R(sL, pL)−
R0), 1} ≤ 1 and pL = sL as well as s′ = min{λ(R(s′, p′)−R(sL, pL)), 1} ≤ 1 and p′ = s′. Since
costs are convex in s, profit from types 10 and 01 is concave in s and is highest if only one
product is offered to types 01 and 10.
(v) Suppose (s′, p′) is bought by types 11, 10 and 01. According to Lemma A8 the original
product line (0, 0), (sL, pL), (sH , pH) must yield higher profit.
The same arguments apply for several additional products. As it is not profitable to introduce
one additional product into the two-product line, introducing several is not profitable either.
Lemma A2. If the monopolist maximizes profits, the equilibrium features one of the following
four consumer partitions (s, sL, sH > 0 and p, pL, pH > 0): Standard good - types 10 and 11
buy (s, p), others (0, 0). Mass market - types 01, 10, and 11 buy (s, p), others (0, 0). Image
building - types 01 and 10 buy (sL, pL), type 11 buys (sH , pH), others (0, 0). Exclusive good
- type 11 buys (s, p), others (0, 0).
Proof. Theoretically, there are 15 ways to split consumers into groups (see Proof of Proposition
4) but most are inconsistent with profit maximization. First, Lemma 2 states an equilibrium
candidate which offers strictly positive profit under heterogeneous image concerns. Thus, any
other equilibrium candidate must offer strictly positive profit. Second, type 00 chooses (0, 0) in
any equilibrium since she values neither quality nor image. Further, it is always profitable to
sell s > 0 to type 11. Thus, no equilibrium candidate can pool these two types. Third, type 01
does not buy if his image is zero but he only buys if he is pooled with type 10 or type 11. This
also implies that a partition that isolates type 01 cannot be profit-maximizing. Fourth, types
10 and 11 cannot be profitably split from each other and separated from a pool of types 01 and
00 because they prefer the same quality-price combination which for both is associated with the
ideal image. Moreover, Lemma 4 rules out full separation, and by Lemma 5 a pure image good
does not exist in equilibrium.
Finally, types 01 and 11 cannot be pooled without type 10. Suppose to the contrary that
the monopolist offers (sP , pP ) to types 01 and 11, a different product (s10, p10)) 6= (0, 0) to
type 10 and type 00 chooses (0, 0). Then, consumers obtain images R(0, 0) = 0, R(sP , pP ) =
βαs
(1−β)αn+βαs , and R(s10, p10) = 1. Incentive compatibility for purely quality-concerned con-
sumers requires sP − pP = s01 − p01 ≤ s10 − p10 which implies by R(sP , pP ) < 1 that
sP + λRP − pP = s11 + λR11 − p11 < s10 + λ − p10 = s10 + λR10 − p10. This violates in-
centive compatibility for consumers of type 11. Therefore type 01 and type 11 choose the same
product only if type 10 chooses the same product.
To further restrict the set of equilibrium candidates, the following four lemmas characterize
the offers which—for a given partition—give the highest profit.
Lemma A3. In standard good, the monopolist maximizes profits by offering
(s, p) =
{
(1, 1) if λ ≤ 1
(λ, λ) if λ > 1
for λ ≤ 2. If λ > 2 a standard good cannot be profitably sustained.
Proof. Denote the product offered by the monopolist by (s, p) with s, p > 0 and the image
corresponding to it by R. Types 01 and 00 are not willing to pay for quality, do not buy, and
obtain an image of zero R(0, 0) = 0. Type 10 buys (s, p) if s−p ≥ 0. Type 11 receive additional
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image utility and buys too. As profit increases in p, s = p. To prevent type 01 from buying
(s, p), it has to fulfill λR(0, 0) ≥ λR − p = λR − s. The monopolist chooses s to maximize
β(s− 12s2) such that s ≥ λR = λ. If the separation is sustained R = 1 and thus, s = max{1, λ}.
If image concern is more than twice as large as marginal utility from quality, λ > 2, a standard
good is not feasible anymore. Hindering type 01 from buying would require a quality so high
that profit is negative.
Lemma A4. In mass market, the monopolist maximizes profits by offering
(s, p) =
{
(λR, λR) if λ ≤ R−1
(1, 1) if λ > R−1
.
Proof. Type 00 does not buy and receives image R(0, 0) = 0. The remaining group has image
R = ββ+αn(1−β) . Incentive compatibility for types 01 and 10 requires p ≤ min{λR, s}. If these
hold, incentive compatibility for type 11 follows. Since profit is increasing in price and a higher
p does not violate any other constraint, p = min{λR, s}.
I show in two steps that profit maximization requires s ≤ min{λR, 1}. Since profit is increas-
ing in s for s ≤ 1 this implies s = min{λR, 1}.
Step 1: Show that s ≤ λR. Suppose to the contrary s > λR. Consider an alternative
product (s′, p′) = (λR, λR) which offers lower quality at the same price. Incentive compatibility
is still fulfilled and profit increases by ∆Π = (β+αn(1− β))(−12(λR)2 + 12s2). Since s > λR by
assumption, ∆Π > 0 contradicting optimality.
Step 2: Show that s ≤ 1. From step 1 we know s ≤ λR and therefore p = s. I distinguish
two cases depending on the size of λ. Suppose first λ ≤ R−1. In this case λR ≤ 1 and part 1
applies. Suppose now λ > R−1. Then, λR > 1. The monopolist chooses s to maximize (β +
αn(1− β))(s− 12s2) such that s ≤ λR. Since λR > 1, the optimal high quality is unconstrained
and thus s = 1.
Lemma A5. In image building, the monopolist maximizes profits by offering
(sL, pL) =
{
(λRL, λRL) if λ ≤ R−1L
(1, 1) if λ > R−1L
and (sH , pH) =
(
1, 1 + λ
αn(1− β)
(1− αs)β + αn(1− β)
)
Proof. Type 00 does not buy and R(0, 0) = 0. The group of types 10 and 01 receives image
RL =
β(1−αs)
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) and type 11 gets image RH = 1. Incentive compatibility for type 11
requires sH + λRH − pH ≥ sL + λRL − pL which is equivalent to
pH ≤ pL + λ αn(1− β)
(1− αs)β + αn(1− β) + sH − sL(7)
Participation of 10 and 01 requires pL ≤ min{λRL, sL}. Incentive compatibility needs sL−pL ≥
sH −pH and λRL−pL ≥ λRH −pH . Profit increases in pH and all other constraints are relaxed
if the price for high quality goes up. Thus, (7) binds and pH = pL+λ
αn(1−β)
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) +sH−sL.
Then, price is chosen as high as possible at pL = min{λRL, sL}. I show in two steps that profit
maximization requires sL ≤ min{λRL, 1}. Since profit is increasing in s for s ≤ 1 this implies
sL = min{λRL, 1}.
Step 1: Show that sL ≤ λRL. Suppose instead sL > λRL. Consider an alternative product
(s′, p′) = (λRL, λRL) of lower quality but the same price. Adjust the price of the high quality
product by the same amount if necessary to ensure incentive compatibility. Profit increases by
at least ∆Π = (β(1− αs) + (1− β)αn)(−12(λRL)2 + 12(sL)2). Since sL > λRL, ∆Π > 0. Thus,
the original product offer was not optimal.
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Step 2: Show that sL ≤ 1. By step 1 sL ≤ λRL and therefore pL = sL. I distinguish
two cases depending on λ and show that sL = 1 < λRL is optimal if λ > R
−1
L and sL = λRL
otherwise. Suppose first that λ ≤ R−1L . Then, λRL ≤ 1 and by step 1 the claim is true. Suppose
now λ > R−1L . Then, λRL > 1. Thus, I have pL = sL and pH = λ
αn(1−β)
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) + sH .
Using these values, the monopolist chooses sL, sH to maximize
(β(1− αs) + (1− β)αn)(sL − 1
2
s2L) + βαs(λ
αn(1− β)
(1− αs)β + αn(1− β) + sH −
1
2
s2H).
This yields sL = sH = 1 and pL = 1 < 1 + λ
αn(1−β)
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) = pH .
Lemma A6. In exclusive market, the monopolist maximizes profits by offering
(s, p) = (1, 1 + λ
1− β
1− αsβ ).
Proof. If we require 00, 01, and 10 to make the same choice, it must be that none of them buys
since 00 will never buy. The group’s image is positive, R(0, 0) = (1−αs)β1−αsβ < 1. Type 11 has image
RH = 1. Incentive compatibility for 11 requires pH ≤ sH + λ(RH −RL) = sH + λ 1−β1−αsβ . For 10
not to prefer 11’s product requires sH ≤ pH and for 01 incentive compatibility requires pH ≥
λ(RH−RL). Both are relaxed if pH increases and profit goes up. Thus, pH = sH +λ(RH−RL).
The profit maximization problem of the monopolist becomes max
sH
Π = βαs(sH+λ
1−β
1−αsβ−12s2H).
The profit maximizing choice is s∗1 = 1 and p1 = 1 + λ
1−β
1−αsβ .
Lemmas A2, A3, A4, A5, and A6 together constitute the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. I first characterize the profit functions, then exclude mass market from consideration,
and finally compare profits across the remaining equilibrium candidates.
Lemma A7. Profits from standard good, image building, and exclusive good are continuous in
λ. (i) Profit in standard good (ΠS) is constant for λ < 1 and decreasing and concave for λ ≥ 1.
(ii) Profit in image building (ΠI) is increasing and concave for λ < αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β(1−αs)β and linearly
increasing for λ > αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β(1−αs)β . (iii) Profit in exclusive good (Π
E) is linearly increasing.
Proof. Lemmas A3, A5, and A6 yield the following profit functions:
ΠS =
{
β
2 if λ ≤ 1
β
(
λ− λ22
)
otherwise
(8)
ΠI =

β(αn(1−β)(αs+2λ)+(1−αs)β(αs(1−λ)2+(2−λ)λ))
2αn+2(1−αn−αs)β if λ ≤ λ2
1
2(β + αn(1− β)) + αnαs(1−β)βλ(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) otherwise
(9)
ΠE = αsβ
(
1
2
+
(1− (1− αs)β − αsβ)λ
1− αsβ
)
(10)
From these I derive
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∂ΠS
∂λ =
{
0 if λ ≤ 1
β(1− λ) < 0 if λ ≥ 1
∂2ΠS
∂λ2
=
{
0 if λ ≤ 1
−β < 0 if λ ≥ 1
∂ΠI
∂λ =
{
β(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2β(1−λ))
αn+(1−αn−αs)β > 0 if λ ≤ λ2
αnαs(1−β)β
αn+(1−αn−αs)β > 0 if λ ≥ λ2
∂2ΠI
∂λ2
=
{
(1−αs)2β2
−αn−(1−αn−αs)β < 0 if λ ≤ λ2
0 if λ ≥ λ2
∂ΠE
∂λ =
αs(1−β)β
1−αsβ > 0
∂2ΠE
∂λ2
= 0
Lemma A8. Offering a mass market product, i.e. a product which attracts all but the ignorant
consumers, is never optimal for the monopolist.
Proof. From Lemma A4, profit in mass market is
(11) ΠM =
{
1
2βλ
(
2− βλβ+αn(1−β)
)
if λ ≤ λ1
1
2(αn(1− β) + β) otherwise
Suppose λ ≤ λ1. Rearranging profits ΠI −ΠM as given in equations 9 and 11, yields
ΠI −ΠM > 0⇔ λ2 αsβ2(αn(2−αs)(1−β)+β(1−αs))2(αn(1−β)+β)((1−αs)β+αn(1−β))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+λ (1−αs)αsβ
2
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+αsβ2 > 0
Since A>0 and B<0, ΠI −ΠM does not have a real root but ΠI > ΠM for all λ ≥ 0.
Suppose λ1 < λ ≤ λ2.
ΠI −ΠM > 0
⇔ −λ2 ((1−αs)β)22((1−αs)β+αn(1−β))+λ
((1−αs)β)2+(1−αs)βαn(1−β)+αn(1−β)αsβ
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) −
(1−αs)β+αn(1−β)
2 > 0
The LHS is a downward-opening parabolic function in λ whose roots enclose the interval (λ1, λ2].
Thus, for λ1 < λ ≤ λ2, it takes only positive values and ΠI > ΠM .
Suppose λ > λ2. In this case, Π
I −ΠM = αnαs(1−β)βλ(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) > 0.
Derivation of λ˜m:
For λ ≥ 1, ΠS is decreasing in λ, ΠM is increasing in λ, and at λ = 1 ΠM > ΠS (equations
8 and 11). By Lemma A8 ΠM is never maximal and therefore λ˜m < 1. Suppose now λ < 1.
Rearranging terms gives
ΠS ≥ ΠI ⇔ λ2 − λ2(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)
2β)
(1− αs)2β +
αn + (1− αs − αn)β
(1− αs)β ≥ 0
Tis expression has two roots λ(1),(2) = 1 + αn(1−β)
(1−αs)2β ±
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
(1−αs)2β and it is
easy to see that λ(1) < 1 < λ(2) so that we have have
(12) ΠS ≥ ΠI if λ ≤ λ(1) = 1 + αn(1−β)
(1−αs)2β −
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
(1−αs)2β =: λSI
Using the respective profit functions from equations 8 and 10 I obtain
(13) ΠS ≥ ΠE if λ ≤ (1− αs)(1− αsβ)
2αs(1− β) =: λSE
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Standard good is optimal if and only if it gives higher profit than image building and exclusive
good, λ˜m := min{λSE , λSI}. Using the definitions in (12) and (13) I compute
(14) λSE ≤ λSI ⇔ αs > 13 and β < 3αs−1αs+α2s and αn ≤
β(1+αs(β+αsβ−3))2
4αs(1−β)2
and thus have
λ˜m :=

(1−αs)(1−αsβ)
2αs(1−β) if 14 holds
1 + αn(1−β)
(1−αs)2β −
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
(1−αs)2β otherwise
Derivation of ˜˜λm:
Suppose λ ≤ λ2.
(15) ΠI ≥ ΠE ⇔ λ2 − λ2β(1− αs) + (1− β)αn − βαs(1− βαs)
β(1− αs)(1− βαs) ≤ 0
The expression has two real roots λ(1) = 0 and λ(2) = 2β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn−βαs(1−βαs)β(1−αs)(1−βαs) and it is
ΠI > ΠE if λ ∈ [0,min{λ(2), λ2}]. Define for later use
(16) λIE,low := λ
(2) = 2
β(1− αs) + (1− β)αn − βαs(1− βαs)
β(1− αs)(1− βαs)
Suppose now λ ≥ λ2. Rearranging terms yields
(17) ΠI ≥ ΠE ⇔ λ ≤ 1
2
(β(1− αs) + (1− β)αn)2(1− βαs)
(1− αs)β2αs(1− β)(1− αn) =: λIE,high
ΠI is concave in λ for λ ≤ λ2, linear thereafter and ΠE is linear in λ for all values of λ
(Lemma A7). Furthermore, we see that ΠE |λ=0 < ΠI |λ=0. Thus, ΠI crosses ΠE only once and
from above. Therefore, the region of λ where image building is optimal, is an interval. With
λIE,low and λIE,high as defined in equations 16 and 17 we have
λIE,high ≥ λ2 ⇒ λIE,low ≥ λ2, and λIE,low ≤ λ2 ⇒ λIE,high ≤ λ2(18)
and λSE ≤ λSI ⇒ λIE,low ≤ λSI
Using (14) and (18), I define
˜˜
λm =

λSE if (14) holds
λIE,low if λIE,low ≤ λ2 and ¬(14) holds
λIE,high if λIE,high ≥ λ2 and ¬(14) hold
(19)
Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. Suppose αs >
1
3 and β <
3αs−1
αs+α2s
and αn <
β(1+αs(β+αsβ−3))2
4αs(1−β)2 so that by Proposition 2
image building is never optimal. The proof is by contradiction.
Since β(1+αs(β+αsβ−3))
2
4αs(1−β)2 is increasing in β, we have αn <
(1+αs)(3αs−1)3
16αs
. Suppose αn ≥ αs.
The above implies (1+αs)(3αs−1)
3
16αs
≥ αs ⇔ 27α4s − 34α2s + 8αs − 1 ≥ 0. However, if αs > 13 then
27α4s − 34α2s + 8αs − 1 = 27α2s(α2s − 1)− 7αs(αs − 1)− 1 < 0 .
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Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. There cannot be a partially pooling equilibrium at another product since purely quality-
concerned consumers will always defect to buying (1, 12).
Moreover, for λ < 12
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β , purely image-concerned consumers must be indifferent
between (1, 12) and (0, 0). In equilibrium only a fraction q of the purely image-concerned con-
sumers buy (1, 12). The associated image is then R(1,
1
2 , q) =
β
q(1−β)αn+β . The indifference
condition for purely image-concerned consumers pins down its participation probability q and
thereby the associated image uniquely:
λ
β
q(1− β)αn + β =
1
2
⇔ q = (2λ− 1) βαs
(2− β)αn(20)
Images associated with all other products must be such that no consumer type wants to
switch. This is ensured for instance by beliefs µ(s′, p′) = 0 for all (s′, p′) 6= (1, 12).
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Suppose two products (1, 12) and (1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) constitute a partially separating equilib-
rium: type 11 buys (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ), type 10 buys (1,
1
2), type 00 chooses (0, 0). Type 01 buys
(1, 12) with probability q and chooses (0, 0) with probability 1− q, where q is given in equation
5. Images are R(0, 0) = 0, R(1, 12) =
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn , and R(1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) = 1. Suppose
out-of-equilibrium beliefs are µ(s, p) = 0 for all other products.
Clearly, type 10 prefers (1, 12) over any other product independent of beliefs.
Type 01 indeed prefers (1, 12) over (1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) in the proposed equilibrium if
(21) U01(1,
1
2
, R(1,
1
2
)) > U01(1 + ε,
(1 + ε)2
2
, R(1 + ε,
(1 + ε)2
2
))
⇔ λ β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn −
1
2
> λ− (1 + ε)
2
2
⇔ ε > ε :=
√
1 + 2λ
q(1− β)αn
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn − 1
For λ < 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β , participation of type 01 is partial since the image of the low quality
product under full participation is too low to compensate for the price of 12 . The participation
probability q of type 01 is given in Equation 5 in the main text.
Consumer type 11 prefers (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) over (1,
1
2) if
(22) U11(1,
1
2
, R(1,
1
2
)) < U11(1 + ε,
(1 + ε)2
2
, R(1 + ε,
(1 + ε)2
2
))
⇔ 1 + λ β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn −
1
2
< 1 + ε+ λ− (1 + ε)
2
2
⇔ ε < ε¯ :=
√
2λ
q(1− β)αn
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn
It follows from (21) and (22) that there is a continuum of separating equilibria (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 )
such that ε ∈ [ε, ε¯].
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The following beliefs sustain (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) as an equilibrium:
µ(s, p) =

1 if (s, p) = (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 )
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn if (s, p) = (1,
1
2)
0 else.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Suppose two products (1, 12) and (1,
1
2 + η) constitute a partially separating equilibrium:
type 11 buys (s, 12s
2 + η), type 10 buys (1, 12), type 00 chooses (0, 0). Type 01 buys (1,
1
2) with
probability q and chooses (0, 0) with probability 1 − q, where q is given in equation 6. Images
are R(0, 0) = 0, R(1, 12) =
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn , and R(s,
1
2s
2 + η) = 1. Suppose out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are µ(s, p) = 0 for all other products.
Clearly, type 10 prefers (1, 12) over any other product independent of beliefs.
Type 01 indeed prefers (1, 12) over (s,
1
2s
2 + η) in the proposed equilibrium if
(23) U01(1,
1
2
, R(1,
1
2
)) ≥ U01(s, 1
2
s2 + η,R(s,
1
2
s2 + η))
⇔ λ β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn −
1
2
≥ λ− 1
2
s2 − η
⇔ η ≥ η := λ q(1− β)αn
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn +
1
2
(1− s2)
For λ < 12
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
(1−αs)β , participation of type 01 is partial since the image of the low quality
product under full participation is too low to compensate for the price of 12 . The participation
probability q of type 01 is given in Equation 6.
Consumer type 11 prefers (s, 12s
2 + η) over (1, 12) if
(24) U11(1,
1
2
, R(1,
1
2
)) ≤ U11(s, 1
2
s2 + η,R(s,
1
2
s2 + η)
⇔ 1 + λ β(1− αs)
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn −
1
2
≤ s+ λ− 1
2
s2 − η
⇔ η ≤ η¯ := λ q(1− β)αn
β(1− αs) + q(1− β)αn + (s− 1) +
1
2
(1− s2)
It follows from (23) and (24) that there is a continuum separating equilibria (for s = 1, a unique
equilibrium) with two products: (1, 12) is bought by type 10 and type 01, (s,
1
2s
2 +η) with s > 1
and η ∈ (η, η¯) is bought by type 11, and type 00 chooses the outside good (0, 0). The following
beliefs sustain this as an equilibrium:
µ(s, p) =

1 if (s, p) = (s, 12s
2 + η) with s > 1, η ∈ (η, η¯)
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn if (s, p) = (1,
1
2)
0 else.
With these beliefs, any other product—associated with zero image—is less attractive to con-
sumer type 11 and 01 than (1, 12).
Proof of Proposition 3
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Proof. For the second part, suppose λ > 12 . I first show that among the separating equilibria a
unique one is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion (IC). In this separating equilibrium ε = ε.
Then, I show that no pooling equilibrium is consistent with IC.
(i) The proof is by contradiction. Assume there is a separating equilibrium as derived in
Lemma 7 with ε > ε. Sustaining this equilibrium would require the belief on (1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) to
be sufficiently low. A necessary condition for “sufficiently low” is µ(1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) < 1. However,
type 00 would do worse by buying (1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) instead of choosing (0, 0) for any belief. Type
01 cannot profit from deviating to (1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) for any belief R(1 + ε,
1+ε
2 ) ∈ [0, 1] by definition
of ε (see the proof of Lemma 7, in particular Equation 22). Also type 10 is better off buying
(1, 12) than anything else, independent of beliefs. Only type 11 can strictly profit from deviating
from (1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) to (1 + ε,
1+ε
2 ). Thus, the only belief consistent with the Intuitive Criterion is
µ(1 + ε, 1+ε2 ) = 1 for which type 11 is better off buying (1 + ε,
1+ε
2 ) than (1 + ε,
1+ε
2 ).
The same argument goes through for all potentially separating equilibria, where s = 1 + ε
and p > 1+ε2 . The only separating equilibrium, which remains is (1,
1
2) and (1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 ) with
participation behavior and beliefs as defined in Lemma 7.
(ii) Consider a pooling equilibrium where type 01 buys (1, 12) with probability q as defined
in Equation 4 and with probability 1− q type 01 choose (0, 0) so that R(1, 12) = βq(1−β)αn+β . I
show in the following that there always exists ε > 0 such that type 11 profits from deviating to
product (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) if he beliefs this to be associated with R = 1, while type 01 cannot profit
from deviating for any belief. But then, according to the Intuitive Criterion, R(1+ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) = 1
since for R(1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) < 1 we would assign positive probability to a type who would never
gain from choosing this product.
Choose ε > 0 such that ε2 < λ(1 − q(1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn ) < ε + ε2 . Then, for the product (1 +
ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) the following holds:
(a) For the most favorable belief R(1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) = 1, type 11 gains from separating:
(25) U11(1,
1
2 , R(1,
1
2)) < U11(1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 , R = 1)⇔ ε2 < λ(1− q(1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn )
(b) Type 01 cannot gain from deviating to (1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) even for the most favorable belief
R(1 + ε, (1+ε)
2
2 ) = 1:
(26) U01(1 + ε,
(1+ε)2
2 , µ = 1) < U01(1,
1
2 , R(1,
1
2))⇔ λ(1− q(1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn ) < ε+ ε2
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. If incentive compatibility and profit maximization do not have to be considered, the
population of four types of consumers can be partitioned in 15 different ways:
One group: 1. {00, 01, 10, 11} (full pooling): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to
qualities yields s = β. Welfare is
(27) W1 = αn(1− β)
(
λβ − 12β2
)
+ αsβ
(
λβ − 12β2 + β
)
+(1− αs)β
(
β − 12β2
)− 12(1− αn)(1− β)β2.
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Two groups: 2. {00, 01}, {10, 11} (standard good): Maximizing the welfare function with
respect to qualities yields sL = 0, sH = 1. Welfare is
(28) W2 = αsβ
(
λ+ 12
)
+ (1− αs)β 12 .
3. {00, 10}, {01, 11} (image good): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL =
(1−αs)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ and sH =
αsβ
αn(1−β)+αsβ . Welfare is
(29) W3 = αsβ
(
− α2sβ2
2(αn(1−β)+αsβ)2 +
αsβλ
αn(1−β)+αsβ +
αsβ
αn(1−β)+αsβ
)
+αn(1− β)
(
αsβλ
αn(1−β)+αsβ −
α2sβ
2
2(αn(1−β)+αsβ)2
)
− (1− αn)(1− β) (1−αs)
2β2
2(αn(1−β)+αsβ−1)2
+(1− αs)β
(
(1−αs)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ −
(1−αs)2β2
2(1−αn(1−β)−αsβ)2
)
.
4. {00, 01, 10}, {11} (exclusive good): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qual-
ities yields sL =
(1−αs)β
1−αsβ , sH = 1. Welfare is
(30) W4 = αsβ
(
λ+ 12
)
+ αn(1− β)
(
(1−αs)βλ
1−β+(1−αs)β −
(1−αs)2β2
2(1−αsβ)2
)
−(1− αn)(1− β) (1−αs)
2β2
2(1−αsβ)2 + (1− αs)β
(
(1−αs)β
1−αsβ −
(1−αs)2β2
2(1−αsβ)2
)
.
5. {00}, {01, 10, 11} (mass market): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0, sH =
β
αn(1−β)+β . Welfare is
(31) W5 = αsβ
(
− β2
2αn(1−β)+β)2 +
βλ
αn(1−β)+β +
β
(1−αn)β+β
)
+(1− αs)β
(
β2
2αn(1−β)+β)2 −
β
αn(1−β)+β
)
+ αn(1− β)
(
βλ
αn(1−β)+β −
β2
2αn(1−β)+β)2
)
.
6. {10}, {00, 01, 11} (other 1): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL =
αsβ
1−β(1−αs) and sH = 1. Welfare is
(32) W6 = αn(1− β)
(
αsβλ
1−β(1−αs) −
α2sβ
2
2(1−β(1−αs))2
)
− (1−αn)α2s(1−β)β2
2(1−β(1−αs))2
+αsβ
(
− α2sβ2
2(1−β(1−αs))2 +
αsβλ
1−β(1−αs) +
αsβ
1−β(1−αs)
)
+ 12(1− αs)β.
7. {01}, {00, 10, 11} (other 2): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0 and sH =
β
1−αn(1−β) . Welfare is
(33) W7 = αsβ
(
βλ
(1−αn)(1−β)+β +
β
1−αn(1−β) −
β2
2(1−αn(1−β))2
)
+(1− αs)β
(
β
1−αn(1−β) −
β2
2(1−αn(1−β))2
)
− (1−αn)(1−β)β2
2(1−αn(1−β))2 .
8. {00, 11}, {01, 10} (other 3): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL =
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β and sH =
αsβ
1−αn(1−β)−β(1−αs) . Welfare is
(34) W8 = αn(1− β)
(
(1−αs)βλ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β −
(αs−1)2β2
2(αnβ−αn+αsβ−β)2
)
+(1− αs)β
(
(αs−1)β
αnβ−αn+αsβ−β −
(αs−1)2β2
2(αnβ−αn+αsβ−β)2
)
− (1−αn)α2s(1−β)β2
2(1−αn(1−β)−β(1−αs))2
+αsβ
(
αsβλ
(1−αn)(1−β)+αsβ +
αsβ
1−αn(1−β)−β(1−αs) −
α2sβ
2
2(1−αn(1−β)−β(1−αs))2
)
.
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Three groups: 9. {00}, {01, 10}, {11} (image building): Maximizing the welfare function with
respect to qualities yields sL = 0,sM =
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β , and sH = 1. Welfare is
(35) W9 = αn(1− β)
(
(1−αs)βλ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β −
(1−αs)2β2
2(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2
)
+(1− αs)β
(
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+β(1−αs) −
(1−αs)2β2
2(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2
)
+ αsβ
(
λ+ 12
)
.
10. {10}, {00, 01}, {11} (other 5): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0, sM = sH = 1. Welfare is
(36) W10 = αsβ
(
λ+
1
2
)
+
1
2
(1− αs)β.
11. {01}, {10, 11}, {00} (other 6): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = sM = 0, sH = 1. Welfare is
(37) W11 = αsβ
(
λ+ 12
)
+ 12(1− αs)β.
12. {10}, {00, 11}, {01} (other 7): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0, sM =
αsβ
1−αn(1−β)−β(1−αs) , sH = 1. Welfare is
(38) W12 = αsβ
(
− α2sβ2
2(αnβ−αn+αsβ−β+1)2 +
αsβλ
(1−αn)(1−β)+αsβ +
αsβ
αnβ−αn+αsβ−β+1
)
− (1−αn)α2s(1−β)β2
2(αnβ−αn+αsβ−β+1)2 +
1
2(1− αs)β.
13. {11}, {10, 00}, {01} (other 8): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0, sM =
(1−αs)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ , sH = 1. Welfare is
(39) W13 = − (1−αn)(1−αs)
2(1−β)β2
2(1−αn(1−β)−αsβ)2 + αsβ
(
λ+ 12
)
+(1− αs)β
(
(1−αs)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ −
(1−αs)2β2
2(1−αn(1−β)−αsβ)2
)
.
14. {10}, {01, 11}, {00} (other 9): Maximizing the welfare function with respect to qualities
yields sL = 0, sM =
αsβ
αn(1−β)+αsβ , sH = 1. Welfare is
(40) W14 = αsβ
(
αsβλ
αn(1−β)+αsβ +
αsβ
αn(1−β)+αsβ −
α2sβ
2
2(αn(1−β)+αsβ)2
)
+αn(1− β)
(
αsβλ
αn(1−β)+αsβ −
α2sβ
2
2(αn(1−β)+αsβ)2
)
+ 12(1− αs)β.
Four groups: 15. {00}, {01}, {10}, {11} (full separation): In this setting, optimal qualities are
obviously s00 = 0, s01 = 0, s10 = 1, s11 = 1. Welfare is
(41) W15 = β
(
αsλ+
1
2
)
.
Rearranging terms reveals that W2 > W3, W2 > W15, W2 > W6, W2 > W7, W2 > W10,
W2 > W11, W2 > W12, W2 > W13, W2 > W14, W9 > W8, W9 > W5 > W1, and W9 > W4, so
that the only two candidates for welfare maximization are partitions 2 and 9.
W2 > W9 ⇔ αn(αs − 1)(β − 1)β(1− 2λ)
2β(αn + αs − 1)− 2αn ⇔ λ >
1
2
(42)
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Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. According to the welfare maximizing allocation, consumers who value either quality or
image are provided with swL =
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β but the profit-maximizing allocation is s
m
L =
(1−αs)βλ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β . It is s
w
L > s
m
L ⇔ λ < 1.
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. The first part is obvious from Proposition 3 and 4. Suppose that λ > 12 . In the compet-
itive allocation, consumers who value either quality or image purchase a product with scL = 1.
The welfare-maximizing allocation is swL =
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β < 1. Consumers who care about
both image and quality purchase a product with scH > 1 = s
w
H .
Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. Purely image-concerned consumers either buy quality s at price p = s or choose (0, 0) in
monopoly. Both yield zero surplus, whereas they receive surplus 12 in competition from buying
(1, 12) for all λ.
For consumers who value image and quality, surplus in monopoly is
(43) CSmon11 =

λ if λ < λ˜m
λ (1−αs)β(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) if λ˜m < λ <
˜˜
λm
λ (1−αs)β(1−αs)β+1−β if λ >
˜˜
λm
In competition, surplus to consumers who value image and quality is
(44) CScomp11 =
{
λ+ 12 if λ ≤ 12
λ+ (s− s22 ) with s =
√
1 + 2λ (1−β)αn(1−β)αn+β(1−αs) if λ >
1
2
Thus, for type 11 consumers monopoly surplus is highest in image building and competitive
surplus is lowest in functional excuse with full participation of types 01. Therefore, I only
evaluate this most extreme case.
(45) CSmon11 − CScomp11 =
1
2
−
√
1 + 2λ
αn(1− β)λ
(1− αs)β + αn(1− β) ≤ 0 for all λ > 0
Even in this case, competition yields higher surplus to types 11. So they are always better off
with competition.
Consumers who value only image can be worse off under competition as demonstrated by
the following example. Apart from jump points at λ ∈ {λ˜m, ˜˜λm, αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β(1−αs)β }, the surplus
to consumers who value only image, is continuous in λ and is continuous in other parameters.
Thus, the example is generic.
Example 3. Suppose αs = 0.625, αn = 0.25, β = 0.625, and λ = 1.5. Then, surplus to
purely image-concerned consumers is 0.576923 in monopoly, which yields an exclusive good.
The surplus purely image-concerned consumers is only 0.571429 in competition, where functional
excuse obtains.
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Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. Consumers who value neither image nor quality obtain a surplus of 0 in either case.
Consumers who value quality profit from competition as proven in Corollary 5.
For consumers who value only image obtain, surplus in monopoly is
CSmon01 =

0 if λ < λ˜m
0 if λ˜m < λ <
˜˜
λm and λ ≤ λ1
λ ((1−αs)β)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 1 if λ˜m < λ <
˜˜
λm and λ > λ1
λ ((1−αs)β)1−αsβ if λ >
˜˜
λm
In competition, surplus to this consumer type is
CScomp01 =
{
0 if λ ≤ 12
λ ((1−αs)β)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 12 if λ > 12
If image building would give positive surplus to consumers who value only image, competition
leads to the functional excuse equilibrium:
λ
((1− αs)β)
αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β > 1(46)
⇔ λ > αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β
(1− αs)β >
1
2
(47)
For λ ≤ λ1, image building yields zero surplus to consumers who value only image so that
functional excuse does clearly better. Also for λ > λ1, surplus to purely image-concerned
consumers from image building is always lower than that from functional excuse: CSmon01 −
CScomp01 = −12 .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose the monopolist has to obey a MQS of s = 1. Products in the standard good
and the exclusive good are unaffected by the MQS. For the mass market (see Lemma A4) the
monopolist then chooses s = max{1,min{1, λR}} = 1. Prices are adjusted such that incentive
compatibility is fulfilled. The optimal product offer is
(s, p) =
{
(1, λR) if λ ≤ R−1
(1, 1) if λ > R−1
For the image building product line (see Lemma A5) the monopolist cannot decrease quality
below 1 and chooses sL = max{1,min{1, λRL}} = 1. Incentive compatibility requires that
the price for the high quality product is adjusted upwards. For λ < R−1, the price for the
low quality product lies below its quality since otherwise the purely image-concerned consumer
would not buy. This yields the optimal product line as
(sL, pL) =
{
(1, λRL) if λ ≤ R−1L
(1, 1) if λ > R−1L
(sH , pH) =
{
(1, λ) if λ ≤ R−1L
(1, 1 + λ(1−RL)) if λ > R−1L
From this I compute profits for each consumer partition. For any set of parameters, the
equilibrium with regulation is given by the offer which maximizes profits. Then, I compute
consumer surplus for each equilibrium, and also welfare as the sum of consumers surplus and
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profit. I compare consumer surplus and welfare with regulation with results from Section 6.
The proof is completed by Examples 4 and 5:
Example 4. Suppose αn =
3
4 , αs =
1
48 , β =
13
64 , λ = 3. With and without regulation, the
monopolist offers an image building product line. The introduction of the MQS s = 1 decreases
profits from 0.38484 to 0.20898 but increases consumer surplus from 0.00317 to 0.05414. The
former effect is stronger: Welfare is 0.38801 without regulation and only 0.26312 with the MQS.
Example 5. Suppose αn =
3
4096 , αs =
1
224 , β =
1
4096 , λ = 2. The monopolist offers an image
building product line without regulation and an exclusive good in the presence of the MQS s = 1.
Consumer surplus decreases from 5.43230× 10−7 without regulation to 3.56475× 10−7 with the
MQS. Profit also decreases. Welfare decreases from 0.00037 without regulation to 3.08073×10−6
with regulation.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Any single-product equilibrium features s = 1 and is unaffected. Suppose we are in a
two-product equilibrium. By Proposition 3 the product chosen by type 11 in this equilibrium
is characterized by s˜ =
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β > 1. MC(s˜) =
1
2 +
αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β is just high
enough to ensure that type 01 prefers to buy (1, 12).
Choose 0 < ε <
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 1. For each product (s, p) set the tax to
(48) t(s, p) =

0 if s ≤ 1
λ αn(1−β)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β if s > 1 and s 6= 1 + ε
λ αn(1−β)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − ε2 if s = 1 + ε
Then, type 11 is best off choosing (1+ε,MC(1+ε)) and paying the associated tax. Assuming
separation holds, his utility is then U11(1 + ε,MC(1 + ε), t) =
1
2 + λ
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β +
1
2ε
2.
This is greater than utility would be from choosing (1, 12) which equals
1
2 + λ
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β .
Moreover, for any other quality level s > 1, s− 12s2 < 12 and type 11 derives strictly lower utility
U11(s,MC(s), t) =
1
2 + λ
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β + s − 12s2 − 12 from choosing it than from choosing
(1, 12). Type 01 does not want to mimic type 11 since U01(1,
1
2) = λ
(1−αs)β
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 12 >
λ (1−αs)βαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 12 + 12ε2 − ε = U01(1 + ε,MC(1 + ε), t). Thus, separation indeed holds.
Since separation is unchanged, the allocation of image remains the same and welfare increases
by the increased efficiency in production because the quality which type 11 chooses now 1 + ε
is smaller than s˜ by construction.
The tax income does not directly affect welfare but is a transit item since it is subtracted
from surplus of type 11 consumers. Thus, it can be seen that there always exists a welfare
improving tax scheme. However, not necessarily everyone is better off. The tax does not affect
choices by types 00, 01, and 10 and thereby does not affect their surplus either. Type 11 is
affected, though. If the functional excuse s˜ is relatively small, s˜ < 3, type 11 is hurt by the
luxury tax even though welfare increases. The reason is that the tax can be larger than the
per unit increase in net surplus. Since taxes cancel out in welfare this implies an increase in
aggregate welfare but consumers of type 11 are still worse off so that the tax does not constitute
a Pareto improvement.
In the absence of the tax, type 11 would choose s˜ =
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β > 1 at a price
p = MC(s˜) = 12 +
αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β which yields utility U11(s˜,MC(s˜)) = s˜ + λ − 12 s˜2. Utility
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with taxation is higher if the following holds:
1
2
+ λ
(1− αs)β
αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β +
1
2
ε2 > s˜+ λ− 1
2
s˜2
From the definition of s˜ we know that λ − 12 s˜2 = λ (1−αs)βαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 12 so that the former is
equivalent to ε2 > 2(s˜− 1) which is only true if ε >√2(s˜− 1) > 0. This requirement on ε can
be fulfilled whenever√
2(s˜− 1) < s˜− 1⇒ 2s˜− 2 < s˜2 − 2s˜+ 1⇔ s˜2 − 4s˜+ 3 > 0
Given s˜ > 1 by definition, this inequality is fulfilled for all s˜ > 3. Thus, a welfare-improving
tax that also constitutes a Pareto improvement exists, whenever s˜ > 3.
To ensure that consumer surplus remains unchanged but choices are unaffected or increases,
a more complicated tax scheme has to be put in place which redistributes the tax income to all
consumers in a lumpsum way. It is not clear that such a scheme always exists.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. It is clear that purely image-concerned consumers cannot be attracted to buy at any
positive price. Only quality-concerned consumers with σ = 1 buy at all and therefore any
product (s, p) 6= (0, 0) will obtain R(s, p) = 1. This implies that no differentiation in terms
of image is possible. The monopolist therefore has to decide only whether to offer a product
which is accepted by both—consumers who only value quality and consumers who additionally
value image—or whether to separate the two. Suppose first that only purely quality-concerned
consumers are served. Then the participation constraint of consumers who only value quality
must bind: p10 = s10. The maximal profit in this case is at s10 = 1 with Π =
(1−αs)β)
2 . Suppose
instead that also image aware consumers buy. Then, the binding participation constraint is the
one of consumers who value both quality and image: p11 = s11 − λ. The profit maximizing
quality level is s11 = 1 and profits are Π = (
1
2 − λ)(β). The proof is completed by comparing
the two expressions.
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B. Supplementary material
Figure B1: Design of bottles for LemonAid and ChariTea.
B.1. Formal comparative statics results
Increases in the fraction of image-concerned consumers, whether they occur among those con-
cerned with quality (αs) or among those who do not value quality (αn), trigger the monopolist
to reduce quality and increase prices. Whereas this increases profits, it makes individual con-
sumers worse off. As the share of quality-concerned consumers (β) increases, the monopolist
raises both quality (as long as it still below s = 1) and prices.
Corollary B1. Suppose the monopolist offers (sL, pL) and (sH , pH) as an image building prod-
uct line with pH > pL.
(i) If λ < αn(1−β)+ββ , sL, pL, pH , and pH−pL increase in β. Otherwise, only pH and pH−pL
increase in β.
(ii) If λ < αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β(1−αs)β , sL and pL decrease, and sH − sL, pH , and pH − pL increase in αs
and αn. Otherwise, only pH and pH − pL increase αs and αn.
Suppose (s, p) is an exclusive good offer. Then, p increases in β and αs, and is independent of
αn. Quality s is independent of preferences.
Proof. This follows directly from taking the respective derivatives of qualities and prices as
defined in Table 2 in the main body of the paper.
Aside from affecting products offered within a given type of equilibrium, changes in the pref-
erence distribution also affect the prevalence of different types of equilibrium. More generally,
the standard good is offered more often if the share of consumers who experience utility from
quality directly (β) increases. However, if instead the fraction of consumers who buy a product
only for its image (αn) increases, the standard good becomes less attractive to the monopolist.
Simultaneously, distortions in quality provision in form of either image building or the exclusive
good become more prevalent the greater the share of consumers with image concerns. Figure
B2 shows a typical example for how the equilibrium thresholds in monopoly depend on the frac-
tion of intrinsically motivated consumers and demonstrates the relevance of the image building
product line.
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Figure B2: Equilibrium thresholds in monopoly for αs = αn = 0.5 (left panel) and αs = αn = 0.9
(right panel). The value of image is rescaled as λλ+1 ∈ [0, 1] which is the weight on
image in the utility function.
Proposition B1. Monopoly offers (i) standard good more often if β increases, (ii) standard
good less often if αs or αn increases, (iii) image building more often if αn increases, and (iv)
exclusive good less often if αn increases.
Proof. Suppose image building does not occur. Then, λ˜m =
˜˜
λm = λSE =
(1−αs)(1−αsβ)
2αs(1−β) as
defined in Equation 13 in the main body of the paper. The derivatives are
∂λ˜m
∂β
=
(1− αs)2
2αs(1− β)2 > 0,
∂λ˜m
∂αs
= − 1− α
2
sβ
2α2s(1− β)
< 0,
∂λ˜m
∂αn
= 0
Suppose image building does occur, λ˜m <
˜˜
λm For λ˜m and
˜˜
λm as defined in equations 15 and 19
in the main body of the paper, we find
∂λ˜m
∂β
=
αn
(
2αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β−2
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
)
2(1−αs)2β2
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
> 0
∂λ˜m
∂αs
= −αn(1−β)
(
4αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(3+αs)β−4
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
)
2(1−αs)3β
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
< 0
∂λ˜m
∂αn
= − (1−β)
(
2αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β−2
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
)
2(1−αs)2β
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2(1+αs)β)
< 0
Independent of whether
˜˜
λm = λIE,low or
˜˜
λm = λIE,high,
˜˜
λm increases in αn.
∂
˜˜
λm
∂αn
=
2
(
1
β−αsβ − 11−αsβ
)
if
˜˜
λm = λIE,low
(1−αsβ)(2−αn(1−β)−(1+αs)β)(αn+(1−αn−αs)β)
2(1−αn)2(1−αs)αs(1−β)β2 if
˜˜
λm = λIE,high
and therefore
∂
˜˜
λm
∂αn
> 0
The signs of the derivatives of
˜˜
λm with respect to αs and β are ambiguous. I consider the
different formula for
˜˜
λm one after the other.
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Case 1:
˜˜
λ = λIE,low
∂λIE,low
∂β
> 0 if
αsβ
2 − α2sβ2
1− 2αsβ + αsβ2 > αn
∂λIE,low
∂αs
> 0 if αn >
β − α2sβ2
1 + β − 2αsβ
Case 2:
˜˜
λ = λIE,high
∂λIE,high
∂β
=
(αn+(1−αn−αs)β)((1−αs)2β2+αn(1−β)(2−β−αsβ))
2(1−αn)(1−αs)αs(1−β)2β3
∂λIE,high
∂αs
= − (αn+(1−αn−αs)β)((1−αs)β(1−α
2
sβ)+αn(1−β)(1−αs(2−αsβ)))
2(1−αn)(1−αs)2α2s(1−β)β2
∂λIE,high
∂β
> 0
if (αn <
1−2αs+α2s
1+αs
and 3αn+αnαs
2(−1+αn+2αs+αnαs−α2s) +
1
2
√
8αn+α2n−16αnαs−2α2nαs+8αnα2s+α2nα2s
(−1+αn+2αs+αnαs−α2s)2
< β)
or (αn =
1−2αs+α2s
1+αs
and 23+αs < β)
or (1−2αs+α
2
s
1+αs
< αn and
3αn+αnαs
2(−1+αn+2αs+αnαs−α2s) −
1
2
√
8αn+α2n−16αnαs−2α2nαs+8αnα2s+α2nα2s
(−1+αn+2αs+αnαs−α2s)2
< β)
∂λIE,high
∂αs
> 0
if 12 < αs and β <
1−2αs
−2αs+α2s and
β−αsβ−α2sβ2+α3sβ2
−1+2αs+β−2αsβ−α2sβ+α2sβ2 < αn
Corollary B2. Suppose competition yields a functional excuse equilibrium, where consumers
who value image and quality buy (s, p). Then, s decreases in β and increases in αs and αn.
Average quality increases in αs and αn and is non-monotone in β.
Proof. From Proposition 3 in the main body of the paper, we know that in functional excuse
(s, p) =
(√
1 +
2αn(1− β)λ
αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β ,
1
2
+
αn(1− β)λ
αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β
)
if purely image concerned consumers buy (1, 12) with probability one. From this I derive
∂s
∂β
=
−2αn(1−αn−αs)(1−β)λ
(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2 − 2αnλαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
2
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
< 0
∂s
∂αs
=
αn(1− β)βλ
(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β)2
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
> 0
∂s
∂αn
=
− 2αn(1−β)2λ
(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2 +
2(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
2
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
> 0
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With the separating products (1, 12) and (s, p) as defined above, average quality in functional
excuse is computed as
Saverage = αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β + αsβ
√
1 +
2αn(1− β)λ
αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β
From this I obtain
∂Saverage
∂β
= 1− αn − αs + αn(−1+αs)αsβλ
(αn+β−(αn+αs)β)2
√
1+
2αn(−1+β)λ
−αn+(−1+αn+αs)β
+αs
√
1 + 2αn(−1+β)λ−αn+(−1+αn+αs)β ≶ 0
∂Saverage
∂αs
= αnαs(1−β)β
2λ
(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2
√
1+
2αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
+β(
√
1 + 2αn(1−β)λαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β − 1) > 0
∂Saverage
∂αn
= 1− β +
αsβ
(
− 2αn(1−β)2λ
(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2 +
2(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
)
2
√
1+
2αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
> 0
B.2. Generalizing types
The main analysis concentrates on the simplified case with σL = ρL = 0 for two reasons. One is
tractability but the more important one is that this simplification prevents quality distortions in
the benchmark model without image concerns because the low quality valuation type is always
excluded. If I modify the model such that σL > 0, the decision whether or not to exclude any
consumer type becomes more delicate. Still, the results from before go through qualitatively:
For low image concern, the product line looks the same as if image concerns were absent: two
quality levels are offered. For intermediate image concerns, three different quality levels are
offered, and consumers who have a low quality valuation and care about image pool with those
who have a high valuation and do not value image on the product of intermediate quality. For
high image concerns, two quality levels are sold, one exclusively to those who value image and
quality, the other one to all other consumers.
These qualitative results are modified in that any type of product line as derived in the
main analysis exists in two versions: one where consumers with the lowest willingness to pay
are excluded, so that the product of lowest quality is (0, 0), and one where they are served a
product of positive quality, where the product of lowest quality is (sL, pL) 6= (0, 0). Whether
the product intended for the lowest type is equal to the outside option or not depends on the
distribution of preferences, σL and σH but it does not depend on the strength of image concerns,
λ, and exclusion does not need to occur.43
B.3. Heterogeneity in wealth
If consumers do not differ in intrinsic quality preferences but in wealth and desire to signal
wealth rather than quality preferences, the model can be directly interpreted that way. In
this reinterpretation, a higher willingness to pay for quality is a signal of wealth not quality
preferences. While the model has been framed as one in which consumers have different tastes
for quality which they want to signal, there is a dual interpretation in which consumers are
heterogeneous in wealth and want to signal their wealth to other consumers. Heterogeneous
43Supplementary material regarding this generalization is available on the author’s homepage or upon request.
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tastes for quality in the indirect utility functions of the presented model can be derived from
direct utility functions with identical reservation prices but income heterogeneity (see e.g. Peitz,
1995). In this setting, consumers with higher income (or higher wealth) value quality more.
Put differently, the taste parameter σ in the indirect utility representation is a measure of the
marginal intrinsic utility from quality relative to the marginal value of money.
If consumers were interested in signaling the compound of taste and income, the model itself
would not have to change. However, the screening problem in which consumers also differ in
their signaling motivation becomes potentially much more complicated because the compound
of the two motivations can take on more than two different values. But this modification is likely
to again yield partial pooling in equilibrium. The underlying intuition is the same as before:
consumers with relatively high intrinsic motivation and wealth but with low image concern
provide positive externalities to consumers with high image concern but relatively low intrinsic
motivation and wealth such that surplus can be increased by pooling these types.
The problem becomes more complicated if instead the inferences regarding taste for quality
and wealth enter utility with opposite signs. Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) analyze a related
problem in which agents choose their degree of prosocial behavior in the presence of image
concerns and monetary incentives. In contrast to their setting, my paper focuses on a strategic
supplier who interferes with the signal space. Providing a formal extension that incorporates the
signal jamming intuition from Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) is beyond the scope of this paper.44
Let me nonetheless provide some intuition on how inferences in my model would be affected by
additional wealth heterogeneity. If intrinsic taste for quality and income are perfectly positively
correlated, the dimensionality of the model remains the same but the spread in valuations
increases. If the correlation is positive but imperfect, the image of having a high taste for quality
associated with the purchase of a high quality product is diluted by the wealth confound but
the basic intuitions of the model will still apply because purchasing higher quality remains a
signal of having a high taste for quality. However, if the correlation between wealth and intrinsic
taste for quality is negative, the inference about intrinsic preferences from purchases becomes
increasingly blurred by wealth differences. In the extreme case of a perfect negative correlation,
those with low intrinsic interest but high wealth may have the highest willingness to pay for
quality and therefore, ceteris paribus, buy the highest quality product. If consumers care about
being perceived as intrinsically interested in quality, such a situation would resemble one in
which purchasing a high quality product is stigmatized (cf. Section 7.4). Those who care about
their image are deterred from buying the high quality because the associated image is worse
than the one of buying lower quality or not buying at all because the less wealthy who value
quality cannot afford high quality. In such a situation, the monopolist will try and pool the
wealthy with the quality-concerned consumers by lowering the price accordingly.
A simple way to capture the intuition from additional wealth heterogeneity, without explicitly
modeling it, is to interpret λ as the product of the informativeness of the purchasing decision
with respect to taste and the value of the social image as such. If the distribution of wealth and
tastes are not aligned, a purchase is not very informative about tastes and thus, the realized
utility from image is low, and vice versa.
I find a different approach much more relevant though: If a consumer population is hetero-
geneous with respect to the three dimensions quality preferences, wealth, and image concern,
the producer could differentiate its products in two quality dimensions, one that appeals to the
intrinsic quality valuation and one that targets wealth alone. We observe this for instance in the
car market, where different categories of cars target wealth but within each category cars differ
in how environmentally friendly they are. Thus, the manufacturer also screens with respect to
sustainability preferences. The formal analysis of optimally screening along multiple dimensions
44Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) provide a solution for their model under the assumption that valuations are normally
distributed and image concerns are independent from intrinsic motivation. The problem becomes significantly
more complicated by introducing a strategic producer and by letting go of independence.
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(other than image concerns) is again beyond the scope of this paper. See for instance Ketelaar
and Szalay (2014) for recent progress in this direction.
B.4. Equivalence between social image and social pressure formulation
Let consumers differ in their interest σ in quality (intrinsic motivation). Suppose consumers
experience negative utility from being seen as consumers who have a low taste for quality,
that is they experience social pressure not to consumer low quality. Denote the inference
that enters utility by Q. Let consumers also differ in their susceptibility to social pressure
ρ. The two-dimensional type (σ, ρ) is drawn from {σL, σH} × {0, 1} with Prob(σ = σH) = β,
Prob(ρ = 1|σ = σH) = αs, and Prob(ρ = 1|σ = σL) = αn.
For a consumer of type σρ, utility takes the form:
(B1) Vσρ(s, p,Q) = σs− ρλQ− p
The term Q realized by a consumer (σ, ρ) is the probability that she has a low taste for
quality conditional on his purchasing decision. Let the model be set up exactly as above on the
monopolist’s side, and use the notation from above.
For any product lineM, the term Q is derived from the posterior belief νM that a consumer
has low taste for quality. This conditional probability is given by
(B2) νM(s, p) =
∑
ρ=0,1 Prob(0, ρ)Prob(bM(0ρ) = (s, p))∑
σ=0,1
∑
ρ=0,1 Prob(σ, ρ)Prob(bM(σρ) = (s, p))
and we obtain for any product line and for each product within a line:
Q(s, p,M) = E[σ = 0|bM(σρ) = (s, p)] = νM(s, p)
The belief νM satisfies (B2) if (s, p) is chosen with positive probability and νM ∈ [0, 1]
otherwise (Bayesian Inference).
Proposition B2. The solution to the monopolist’s problem are equivalent for the utility func-
tions as stated in equation (1) in the main body of the paper and equation (B1).
Proof. I show that the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the two problems
coincide.
First note that
Q(s, p,M) = 1−R(s, p,M)(B3)
⇒ Vσρ(s, p,Q) = Uσρ,R(s, p)− λρ(B4)
Note further that this relationship holds also true for the images R and Q associated with
the outside option (0, 0).
Consider the participation constraint of consumer type σρ:
Vσρ(s, p,Q(s, p)) ≥ −λρQ(0, 0)
⇔ σs− ρλQ(s, p)− p ≥ −λρQ
⇔ σs− ρλ(1−R(s, p))− p ≥ −λρ(1−R(0, 0))
⇔ Uσρ(s, p,R(s, p)) ≥ λρR(0, 0)
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint between products (s, p) and (s′, p′) of con-
sumer type σρ:
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Vσρ(s, p,Q(s, p)) ≥ Vσρ(s′, p′, Q(s′, p′))
⇔ σs− ρλQ(s, p)− p ≥ σs′ − ρλQ(s′, p′)− p′
⇔ σs− ρλ(1−R(s, p))− p ≥ σs′ − ρλ(1−R(s′, p′))− p′
⇔ Uσρ(s, p,R(s, p)) ≥ Uσρ(s′, p′, R(s′, p′))
B.5. Selecting the welfare-maximizing competitive equilibrium
Comparing the competitive market outcome to the welfare-maximizing allocation, we observe
that the competitive allocation implements the optimal partition of consumers but not in the
most efficient way. But the welfare comparison between monopoly and competition does not
depend on the Intuitive Criterion selecting a particularly bad equilibrium. Even when I use the
equilibrium which gives the highest welfare in the competitive market, there still exist parameter
constellations such that monopoly yields higher welfare.
Lemma B9. The competitive equilibrium which yields the highest welfare is
(i) standard good for λ ≤ 12
(ii) image building with sl = sh = 1 for λ >
1
2 .
(a) for 12 < λ <
1
2
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn
β(1−αs) , purely image-concerned consumers participate with
probability q = (2λ−1) β(1−β)αn and prices are pl = 12 , ph = 12 +λ(1−
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn ).
(b) for λ ≥ 12 β(1−αs)+(1−β)αnβ(1−αs) , purely image-concerned consumers participate with proba-
bility one and prices are pl =
1
2 , ph =
1
2 + λ(1− β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn ).
Proof. I have shown that for λ < 12 , the equilibrium in the competitive setup is unique. Thus,
the respective equilibrium, the standard good, where consumers with σ = 1 buy quality s = 1
at price p = 12 and consumers with σ = 0 choose the outside option (0, 0) is also the welfare
maximizing equilibrium in the competitive market for λ < 12 .
For λ > 12 , the standard good cannot be sustained as in equilibrium anymore. A continuum
of partially separating equilibria (purely image-concerned and purely quality interested buyers
buy the same product and those who value both characteristics separate by buying another
product) and pooling equilibria (consumers who value at least one of the tow characteristics
quality and image buy the same product, no other product is sold) coexist (see Lemmas 6,
7, and 8 in the main body of the paper). Since for a given partition of consumers, prices
do not affect welfare, I can exclude the pooling equilibria (with full and partial participation
of purely image-concerned consumers) from consideration according to Proposition 4 in the
main body of the paper. Among the partially separating equilibria, the welfare maximizing
equilibrium allocates quality sL = 1 to consumers who care about either quality or image and
quality sH = 1 to consumers who value image and quality because s = 1 maximizes efficiency
in production. Separation is ensured through setting prices pL < pH and beliefs appropriately.
For simplicity, I assume in the following, that beliefs on all products (s, p) not bought in
equilibrium are zero, µ(s, p) = 0. In any partially separating equilibrium with participation
probability q for purely image-concerned consumers, beliefs are µ(sL, pL) =
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn
and µ(sH , pH) = 1. It follows from Lemma 8 in the main body of the paper that pL =
1
2 and
pH =
1
2 + λ
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+q(1−β)αn .
The participation probability of consumers who only care for quality is determined by the
value of image. For λ ≤ 12 , no purely image-concerned consumer wants to participate, for λ >
B.7
1
2
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn
β(1−αs) , all purely image-concerned consumers prefer to participate. For intermediate
values of λ, the indifference condition of these consumer types pins down the participation
probability as q = (2λ− 1) β(1−β)αn .
The following examples show that Proposition 5 from the main body of the paper extends to
a setting where I select the competitive equilibrium which yields the highest attainable welfare
in competition.
Example B6. Suppose λ = 1.71875, β = 0.484375, αs = 0.853859, and αn =
1
3 . Then,
λ˜m =
˜˜
λm = 0.0973251 < λ. Thus, monopoly offers the exclusive good which yields welfare
WE = 0.953308. Welfare from the best competitive equilibrium for these parameters is only
W sep−all = 0.953278.
Example B7. Suppose λ = 0.75, β = 0.5, αs = 0.0208333, and αn = 0.5. Then, λ˜m =
0.5 < λ <
˜˜
λm = 212.276. Thus, monopoly implements image building which yields welfare
WE = 0.289058. In competition, the best welfare equilibrium for these parameters is a par-
tially separating equilibrium. Purely image-concerned consumers participate with probability
q = 0.755319 and welfare is only W sep−part = 0.257813.
B.6. Consumers play against monopolist’s plan
If the monopolist offers an image building product line or an exclusive good as derived above,
the consumer game has two equilibria. One where the consumers behave as intended by the
monopolist and one where consumers coordinate against him. The second case leads to the
product not being optimal anymore for the monopolist so that one equilibrium condition is
violated. If consumers are anticipated to deviate, an alternative product offer can be derived
that induces a unique equilibrium in the ensuing consumer game.
Lemma B10. Suppose consumers can coordinate and choose a product different from the one
the monopolist intended they buy. In the adjusted image building product line, the monopolist
maximizes profits by offering
(sL, pL) =
{
(λRL, λRL) if λ ≤ R−1L
(1, 1) if λ > R−1L
and (sH , pH) =
(
1, 1 + λ
αn(1− β)
β + αn(1− β)
)
Proof. If the monopolist offers two products as derived for the image building product line in the
main part, the ensuing subgame among consumers has two equilibria. One, where consumers
sort onto the two products as intended by the monopolist, and a second one, where consumer
types 01, 10, and 11 all buy the lower quality product and nobody buys the high quality
product. In this equilibrium, types 01 and 11 are better off than in the separating equilibrium,
while profits to the monopolist are lower. The adapted product line leaves an appropriately
higher rent to type 11 to deter this deviation. The non-deviation constraint is
pH = sH − sL + pL + λ(R(sH)|sep −R(sL)|pool)
With optimal quality choices, the optimal low quality price and plugging in for images this
becomes
pH = 1 + λ
αn(1− β)
β + αn(1− β) .
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Lemma B11. Suppose consumers can coordinate and choose a product different from the one
the monopolist intended they buy. In the adjusted exclusive market, the monopolist maxi-
mizes profits by offering
(s, p) = (1, 1 + λ(1− β)).
Proof. If the monopolist offers an exclusive good, the consumption stage again has two equilib-
ria. Instead of actually buying the exclusive good, types 11 could collectively deviate from the
monopolist’s plan and not buy at all. This would increase the image associated with not buying
such that types 11 and 01 are better off than if the exclusive good was bought by type 11. The
monopolist would have preferred to offer a product which is immune to such deviations. This
requires that the following constraint holds:
pH = sH + λ(R(sH)|sep −R(sL)|pool) = 1 + λ(1− β)
If consumers play their preferred equilibrium in both cases where there is multiplicity, the
monopolist adjusts its behavior and in equilibrium never offers the ambiguous products but the
deviation-proof versions.
Proposition B3. Suppose consumers can coordinate and choose a product different from the
one the monopolist intended they buy. There exist 0 < λ˜adjm ≤ ˜˜λadjm such that the profit-
maximizing product offer of a monopolistic producer is given by
(i) standard good if λ ≤ λ˜adjm .
(ii) adjusted image building if λ˜adjm ≤ λ ≤ ˜˜λadjm .
(iii) adjusted exclusive good if λ ≥ ˜˜λadjm .
Proof. From Lemmas B2 and B3, I compute the following profit functions.
ΠI,adj =

1
2β
(
αs + 2λ− 2αsβλαn+β−αnβ +
(−1+αs)2βλ2
−αn+(−1+αn+αs)β
)
if λ ≤ λ2
1
2(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β) + αsβ
(
1
2 +
αn(1−β)λ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β+αsβ
)
if λ > λ2
ΠE,adj = αsβ
(
1
2
+ (1− (1− αs)β − αsβ)λ
)
Note that profits in standard good and mass market are unchanged as the respective products
are unchanged. These are stated in Equations 8 and 11 in the main body of the paper.
Results for the overall equilibrium are qualitatively the same as derived above. I proceed as
follows.
First, one can show that image building gives always at least the same profit as mass market,
ΠI ≥ ΠM , and therefore mass market does not have to be considered further.
Second, the standard good maximizes profits for low λ:
ΠS > ΠI,adj ⇔ λ < λadjSI
where
λadjSI :=
(αn(1−β)+β(1−αs)2
(1−αs)2(β+αn(1−β)(B5)
−
√
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)(α2n(1−β)2+αn(2−(3−αs)α2s)(1−β)β+(1−αs)2(1+2αs)β2)
(1−αs)2(αn(1−β)+β)β
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and
ΠS > ΠE,adj ⇔ λ < 1− αs
2αs(1− β) =: λ
adj
SE(B6)
Define the threshold λ˜adj as the minimum of the two
(B7) λ˜adj := min{λadjSE , λadjSI }
A sufficient condition for image building determining the threshold is that image concerns are
more prevalent for those not intrinsically interested in quality, αn > αs.
Next, I derive the value of image for which exclusive good gives higher profit than image
building. Since image building is determined piecewise, two cases have to be considered
ΠE,adj > ΠI,adj if
{
λ > λadjIE,low if λ < λ2
λ > λadjIE,high if λ > λ2
where
(B8) λadjIE,low :=
2(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)(αn(1−αs(1−β))(1−β)−(1−αs(2−β))β)
(1−αs)2(αn(1−β)+β)β
and
(B9) λadjIE,high :=
(αn(1− β) + β)(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)β)
2(1− αn)αs(1− β)β2
One can show that
λadjIE,low < λ2 ⇒ λadjIE,high < λ2 and λadjIE,high > λ2 ⇒ λadjIE,low > λ2
by noting that the profit functions for image building is continuous and weakly concave whereas
the profit function for exclusive good is linearly increasing. Thus, if image building maximizes
profit for some λ, it maximizes profit for an interval of values for λ. If image building is not
optimal for any value of λ, the threshold to exclusive good is given by λadjSE . Using the definitions
from Equations B6, B7, B8, and B9, I obtain
˜˜
λadj :=

λadjSE if λ˜
adj = λadjSE
λadjIE,low if λ < λ2 and λ˜
adj = λadjSI
λadjIE,high if λ > λ2 and λ˜
adj = λadjSI
(B10)
Qualitatively, the equilibrium is exactly what I have shown by focusing on the equilibrium
preferred by the monopolist.
While consumers intend to do better by coordinating against the monopolist, the adjustment
of the product line may be detrimental to consumer surplus. The following numerical example
illustrates the case.
Example B8. Suppose the parameters take the following values: β = 0.00170898, αn =
0.00012207, αs = 0.314941, and λ = 1.28931. Then, the thresholds derived above are λ˜
adj =
λadjSI = 0.67984 < 1.08887 = λ
adj
SE,
˜˜
λadj = λadjIE,high = 1.28879 > 1.10409 = λ2. Thus, if consumers
coordinated against the monopolist would offer an exclusive good. Corresponding consumer sur-
plus is CSE,adj = 1.369983−6. If instead, consumers follows the prescriptions by the monopolist,
the thresholds are λ˜ = λSI = 0.67984 < 1.08887 = λSE,
˜˜
λ = λIE,high = 1.32751 > 1.10409 = λ2.
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If unconstrained by consumers’s coordination, the monopolist would still offer an image building
product line. Consumer surplus would be CSI = 0.000629.
Using the computations on the welfare-maximizing competitive equilibrium (see Lemma B1),
it turns out that there still exist parameter constellations such that monopoly gives higher
welfare than competition.
Example B9. Suppose the following values: αs = 0.0625, αn = 0.109375, β = 0.0546875, λ =
1. Then, λ˜adj = λadjSI = 0.522462 < 7.93388 = λ
adj
SE,
˜˜
λadj = λadjIE,high = 77.6802, and λ2 = 3.01667.
Monopoly implements an image building product line which yields welfare W I,adj = 0.047899.
The welfare-maximizing equilibrium in competition is a partially separating equilibrium with
partial participation and yields only welfare W sep-part = 0.030762.
Example B10. Suppose the following parameter values αs = 0.852661, αn = 0.335938, β =
0.486328, λ = 1.70703. Then, λ˜adj =
˜˜
λadj = λadjSE = 0.1682 < 0.201117 = λ
adj
SI . Monopoly
implements and exclusive good and yields welfare WE,adj = 0.951257. Competition in the
welfare-maximizing equilibrium yields a partially separating equilibrium with full participation
of purely image concerned consumers (λ > 1.70411 = 12R
−1
L ) and thereby only lower welfare of
W sep-all = 0.951172.
B.7. The role of Assumption 1
In the main text, I have derived the optimal product offer under the assumption that consumers
do not randomize but if indifferent between buying a product and not participating always
purchase the product (Assumption 1 in the main body of the paper). In this subsection I first
show that the equilibrium under Assumption 1 is indeed in pure strategies. Second, I derive the
optimal product offer without this tie-breaking assumption and illustrate that the result from
the main text remain qualitatively unchanged.
B.7.1. The equilibrium under Assumption 1 is in pure strategies
Proposition B4. Under Assumption 1, the profit maximizing product line induces an equilib-
rium in pure strategies in the consumption stage.
Proof of Proposition B5:
Proof. By Lemma A1, the monopolist offers at most two products and the non-participation
option. Using this result, I first proof that randomization in single-product lines is not profitable
(Lemma B4). Then, I show that in two-product lines, randomization between products is not
profitable either (Lemma B5). Finally, I show, that randomization by type 01 or 11 in two-
product lines is also not profitable (Lemmas B6 and B7). Randomization by type 10 has been
excluded through Assumption 1.
Lemma B12. Suppose the monopolist maximizes profits by offering one product (s, p) 6= (0, 0).
Then, the offer induces a pure-strategy equilibrium in the consumer game.
Proof. Suppose the monopolist offers (s, p) 6= (0, 0). Since otherwise profit is zero, at least some
consumers of type 10 or type 11 buy (s, p) and p > 12s
2.
(i) Suppose consumer type 11 buys (s, p) with probability q and (0, 0) with probability 1− q.
For given price and quality, profit increases in q since p− 12s2 > 0. Further, the image associated
with (s, p) (with (0, 0)) increases (decreases) in q. Thus, the price which can be maximally
charged increases in q. Therefore, the monopolist maximizes profit for q = 1. The same
argument holds for type 10.
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(ii) Suppose consumer type 01 buys (s, p) with probability q and (0, 0) with probability 1− q.
Without loss of generality assume that type 11 and 10 buy (s, p) with probability 1 and type
00 chooses (0, 0). Then, R(s, p) = βqαn(1−β)+β and R(0, 0) = 0. Indifference requires
λR(s, p) = p⇔ q = β(λ− p)
αn(1− β)p
By the same arguments as in Lemma A5 in the Appendix, I obtain the profit maximizing
product as
(s, p) =
{
( βλβ+αnq(1−β) ,
βλ
β+αnq(1−β)) if λ < R(s, p)
−1
(1, 1) else.
The corresponding profit is increasing in q
Π =
{
1
2βλ
(
2 + βλαnq(−1+β)−β
)
if λ < R(s, p)−1
1
2(β + αn(q − qβ)) else.
and
∂Π
∂q
> 0
Suppose the monopolist offers a product line which maximizes profits within the set of offers
that induce a pure-strategy equilibrium in the consumption stage. According to Proposition 1
in the Appendix, the offer takes the form of an “image building” product line where types 00
choose (0, 0), types 10 and 01 buy (sL, pL), and type 11 buys (sH , pH) and sL ≤ sH . To simplify
notation, define ∆R = R(sH , pH)−R(sL, pL).
Furthermore, the following set of conditions will be helpful in subsequent derivations:
(IC10) sH − pH ≤ sL − pL
(IC01) λR(sH , pH)− pH ≤ λR(sL, pL)− pL
(PC01) λR(sL, pL)− pL ≥ λR(0, 0)
(PC10) sL − pL ≥ 0
(IC11) sH + λR(sH , pH)− pH ≥ sL + λR(sL, pL)− pL
(PC11) sH + λR(sH , pH)− pH ≥ λR(0, 0)
The images R(sH , pH), R(sL, pL), and R(0, 0) will be stated separately in each case. Ad-
ditional conditions which will be detailed where necessary. It is easily verified that PC11 is
automatically fulfilled whenever the other constraints hold.
Lemma B13. Suppose the monopolist maximizes profits by offering two products (sL, pL) 6=
(sH , pH), (si, pi) 6= (0, 0) for i = L,H. Then, consumers do not randomize over (sL, pL) and
(sH , pH).
Proof. (i) Suppose type 10 buys (sH , pH) with probability q and (sL, pL) with probability
1 − q. Suppose that type 01 buys (sL, pL) and type 11 buys (sH , pH). Then R(sH , pH) = 1,
R(sL, pL) =
(1−q)(1−αs)β
(1−q)(1−αs)β+αn(1−β) , and R(0, 0) = 0 and IC01, IC11, PC01, and PC10 have to hold.
Additionally, IC10 has to hold with equality to keep type 10 indifferent between the two products.
From the two participation constraints PC10 and PC01 I obtain pL = min {sL, λR(sL, pL)}. By
the same arguments as in Lemma A5 in the appendix this implies sL = min {1, λR(sL, pL)},
and sL = pL. Then, from IC10 follows sH = pH . Using this in IC01 I obtain
(B11) sH − sL ≥ λ∆R
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If unconstrained, the monopolist would like to sell sL = sH = 1. Thus, (B11) binds at the
optimum and sH = sL + λ∆R. The corresponding profit is
Π = (q(1− αs)β + αsβ)(sL + λ∆R− 12(sL + λ∆R)2)
+((1− q)(1− αs)β + αn(1− β))(sL − 12s2L)
with optimal quality choices
sL = max{0, 1− q(1− αs)β + αsβ
β + αn(1− β) λ∆R} < 1
sH =
{
λ∆R if sL = 0
1 + (1−q)(1−αs)β+αn(1−β)β+αn(1−β) λ∆R if sL > 0
For sL = pL = 0, types 11 and 10 buy sH = pH = 1 and type 01 pools with type 00 on the
outside option (0, 0); no randomization takes place q = 1. For λ < (∆R)−1 αn(1−β)+βq(1−αs)β+αsβ , I
obtain sL > 0 and profit is
Π =
1
2
(αn(1− β) + β)(B12)
− α
2
n(1− β)2(q(1− αs)β + αsβ)λ2
2(αn(1− β) + (1− q)(1− αs)β)(αn(1− β) + β)
Profit from (B12) is maximal at q = 0; at the optimum, no randomization takes place.
(ii) Suppose type 01 buys (sH , pH) with probability q and (sL, pL) with probability 1 − q.
Suppose further that type 10 buys (sL, pL) and type 11 buys (sH , pH). Then R(sH , pH) =
αsβ
qαn(1−β)+αsβ , R(sL, pL) =
(1−αs)β
(1−q)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β , and R(0, 0) = 0. Conditions IC10, IC11, PC01,
and PC10 have to hold. Additionally, IC01 has to hold with equality for type 01 to remain
indifferent: pH = pL + λ∆R.
Note that this product line is only feasible as long as
R(sH , pH) ≥ R(sL, pL)⇔ q ≤ αsβ
αsβ + (1− αs)β
In analogy to the proof of Lemma A5 in the appendix, I find
pL = min {λR(sL, pL), sL} and sL = min {λR(sL, pL), 1}
I distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Suppose λ < R(sL, pL)
−1. Then, sL = λR(sL, pL) = pL. From IC01 I obtain
pH = λR(sH , pH) and from IC10 sH ≤ λR(sH , pH). Profit is increasing in sH for sH ≤ 1. Thus,
we obtain sH = min {1, λR(sH , pH)} . I plug in the derived values into the profit function and
simplify profits:
(B13) Π =

βλ+
(qαn(1−β)((1−αs)β−αsβ)β+αsβ((1−αs)2β2+(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)αsβ))λ2
2((−1+q)αn(1−β)−(1−αs)β)(qαn(1−β)+αsβ)
if λ < R(sH , pH)
−1
1
2
(
−qαn(1− β) + αsβ(−1 + 2λ) + (1− αs)βλ
(
2− (1−αs)βλ(1−q)αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β
))
if R(sH , pH)
−1 < λ < R(sL, pL)−1
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I maximize profit according to (B13) with respect to the probability q that type 01 buys (sH , pH)
and obtain
q∗ =

αs if λ < R(sH , pH)
−1
1
2
(
1 +
(1−αs)β(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β+(1−αs)βλ2)
αn(1−β)(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β) −
√
((αn(1−β)+(1−αs)2β)2+(1−αs)2β2λ2)2
α2n(1−β)2(αn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2
)
if R(sH , pH)
−1 < λ < R(sL, pL)−1
Profit at q∗ is
Π =

1
2βλ
(
2− βλαn(1−β)+β
)
if λ < R(sH , pH)
−1
αsβ
(−12 + λ)+ 12(1− αs)βλ(2− (1−αs)βλαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)
if R(sH , pH)
−1 < λ < R(sL, pL)−1
and never exceeds profit from a deterministic image building product line as derived in Lem-
mas A5 and A7 and stated in equation 8 in the appendix.
Case 2: Suppose λ ≥ R(sL, pL)−1. SinceR(sL, pL) < R(sH , pH) this implies λ > R(sH , pH)−1.
Due to the quadratic cost function profit is decreasing in qualities si for si > 1, i = L,H. There-
fore, the monopolist sets sL = sH = 1. This yields pL = 1 and pH = 1 + λ∆R. Profit is then
Π =
1
2
(αn(1− β) + β) + αn(1− β)(−αsβ + qβ)λ
(−1 + q)αn(1− β)− (1− αs)β
This profit is maximal at q = 0 and the monopolist does not profit from randomization.
(iii) It is easy to see that profits do not increase either if type 11 randomizes between the
high and the low quality product. Suppose type 11 is indifferent between (sL, pL) and (sH , pH).
If a fraction 1− q of type 11 buys (sL, pL) this increases the associated image. However, if the
monopolist increases pL in response to the image increase, types 10 stop buying (sL, pL) unless
he also increases sL. But an increase in sL makes the low quality product more attractive to
type 11, thereby breaking the indifference of type 11.45 Therefore, pL and sL remain unchanged.
Having type 11 buy the low quality decreases profits since pH − 12s2H > pL − 12s2L due to the
image-premium charged from type 11.
Lemma B14. Suppose the monopolist maximizes profits by offering two products (sL, pL) 6=
(sH , pH), (si, pi) 6= (0, 0) for i = L,H. Then, consumer type 01 does not randomize over (sL, pL)
and (0, 0).
Proof. Let q denote the probability that type 01 buys (sL, pL) and with (1− q) he takes (0, 0).
Suppose only type 11 buys (sH , pH). Then R(sL, pL) =
(1−αs)β
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β) and R(sH , pH) = 1.
For type 01 to mix between (sL, pL) and (0, 0), PC01 has to bind. Together with PC10 this
gives sL ≥ λR(sL, pL) = pL. Since quality is costly to produce the monopolist sets sL =
λR(sL, pL).
Using this in IC11 yields
(B14) pH ≤ pL + sH − sL + λ∆R = sH + λ∆R.
Under profit maximization constraint B14 binds. The monopolist maximizes profits by setting
sH = 1 and
(sL, pL) = (λR(sL, pL), λR(sL, pL)) and (sH , pH) = (1, 1 + λ∆R).
45The monopolist can increase sH to sustain indifference but this does quite obviously not increase profits either.
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The corresponding profit increases in q:
Π = αsβ2 +
qαn(1−β)αsβλ
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β)
+(qαn(1− β) + (1− αs)β)
(
(1−αs)βλ
(1−αs)β+qαn(1−β) −
(1−αs)2β2λ2
2(qαn(1−β)+(1−αs)β)2
)
∂Π
∂q
=
αn(1− αs)(1− β)β2(2αs + (1− αs)λ)λ
2(αnq(1− β) + (1− αs)β)2 > 0.
Lemma B15. Suppose the monopolist maximizes profits by offering two products (sL, pL) 6=
(sH , pH), (si, pi) 6= (0, 0) for i = L,H. Then, consumer type 11 does not randomize over any
product and (0, 0).
Proof. Let q denote the probability of type 11 buying (sH , pH) and by (1− q) the probability of
her choosing (0, 0). Denote by γi10, γ
i
01 the fractions of the population which are of type 10 and
01, respectively, and buy product i for i ∈ {L,H}. The required indifference in PC11 implies
pH = λ(R(sH , pH)−R(0, 0)) + sH
= λ(1− (1− q)αsβ
(1− q)αsβ + (1− β)αn(1− γL01 − γH01) + (1− αs)β(1− γL10 − γH10)
) + sH
The price pH increases in q and so do per-unit profits from sales of (sH , pH). Furthermore,
profits from selling (sL, pL) also increase in q since analogous to Lemma A5 in the appendix:
pL = sL
= min{1, λ( (1−αs)βγL10
(1−αs)βγL10+(1−β)αnγL01
− (1−q)αsβ
(1−q)αsβ+(1−β)αn(1−γL01−γH01)+(1−αs)β(1−γL10−γH10)
)}
and thus pL and sL increase in q. Finally, at the margin type 11 buying (sH , pH) contributes
pH − 12s2H > 0 to profits so that the monopolist looses from type 11 not buying directly.
Thus, I have shown that randomization of types 01 or 11 is not profitable. By Assumption 1
type 10 does not randomize. This completes the proof.
B.7.2. Without Assumption 1 qualitatively similar results obtain but inducing consumers
to randomize may be profitable
To investigate the problem without Assumption 1, I fist prove the generalization of Lemma B4.
Lemma B16. Suppose the monopolist maximizes profits by offering one product (s, p) 6= (0, 0).
Then type 10 does not randomize between (s, p) and (0, 0).
Proof. Let q denote the probability of type 10 buying the high quality product and 1 − q the
probability that type 10 chooses (0, 0). Suppose q ∈ (0, 1). Type 10 finds it profitable to
randomize in this way if and only if s = p. The profit maximizing quality choice is then s = 1
and profits from sales of (s, p) are (q(1 − αs)β + αsβ)(sH − 12s2H) = 12(q(1 − αs)β + αsβ) and
increasing in q. Thus, q ∈ {0, 1} and type 10 does not randomize.
The next lemma characterizes a possibly profitable 2-product line where type 10 randomizes
between the lower quality product and not participating. I call this image building with
randomization because of its similarity to the image building product line.
Lemma B17. There exists a stochastic mechanism where two products with positive quality are
offered and type 10 randomizes over buying the lower quality product and not participating and
a set of parameters such that this mechanism maximizes monopoly profits.
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Proof. Suppose a product line with two positive quality products (sL, pL), (sH , pH) is offered
and that type 10 randomizes over buying the lower of the two qualities, sL, and not buying
at all. Denote by q the probability that type 10 buys the lower quality product; 1 − q is the
probability that type 10 does not buy.
When type 10 does not always participate, the image of non-participation increases whereas
the image associated with the lower quality product decreases. The proposed structure is only
feasible as long as the image associated with the lower quality product is greater than the image
associated with not buying since only the difference between the two, multiplied by the value
of image λ is the price which can be charged for this product.
The image of the lower quality product is higher than the one for non-participation as long
as
R(sL, pL) ≥ R(0, 0)⇔ q ≥ αn
Thus, for αn = 1 the only admissible product line of this type has q = 1 and randomization
of type 10 does not have to be considered.
Analogous to the derivation of the pure strategy image building product line, I derive that
the products with randomization take the following form:
sH = 1 and sL =

λ
(
(1−αs)qβ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)qβ −
(1−αs)(1−q)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ−(1−αs)qβ
)
if λ < (RL −R(0))−1
1 else
pH = 1 + λ
αn(1− β)
q(1− αs)β + αn(1− β) and pL = sL
Suppose this product line is feasible, i.e. q ≥ αn. Profit from image building with randomiza-
tion is then
(B15)
ΠIrand =

αsβ
2 +
αnαs(1−β)βλ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)qβ
+(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)qβ){
(
(1−αs)qβ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)qβ −
(1−αs)(1−q)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ−(1−αs)qβ
)
λ
−12
(
(1−αs)qβ
αn(1−β)+(1−αs)qβ −
(1−αs)(1−q)β
1−αn(1−β)−αsβ−(1−αs)qβ
)2
λ2}
if λ < (RL −R(0))−1
1
2(αn(1− β) + αsβ + (1− αs)qβ) + αnαs(1−β)βλαn(1−β)+(1−αs)qβ
else
I conclude the proof by an example in which image building with randomization gives higher
profit than any pure strategy mechanism.
Example B11. Profitable randomization: Suppose we have α10 =
1
32 , α01 =
379
4096 , α11 =
1
16 , λ =
21
4 , q =
3
4 . Plugging in reveals that the relevant constraints onλ and q are satisfied. I
have shown before that for λ large enough, as is the case here, neither the standard good nor
the mass market have to be considered (see Lemma A8 in the appendix and Proposition 2 in the
paper).
Profits corresponding to the example are ΠIrand =
1365977
3891200 = 0.351043,ΠIdet =
468531
1384448 =
0.338424,ΠE =
223
640 = 0.348438 with ΠIrand being the largest.
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Corollary B3. Inducing partial participation of type 10 allows to sell two different quality levels
for higher values of image than under full participation.
Proof. In general, the threshold above which both qualities are equal to one is (RL −R(0))−1.
Since partial participation decreases RL and increases R(0), the threshold increases (as long as
the participation probability is admissible, see above).
It is instructive that we find an example in the case where sL = 1 = pL < λRL in the
deterministic image building. In this case, the value of image is so large that the purely image
concerned consumer 01 earns a rent when buying the lower quality product. Having type 10
only partially participate reduces the image associated with the lower quality product. This
lowers not only the rent to type 01 but also the rent which has to be left to type 11. By inducing
type 10 to only partially participate, the monopolist can increase the price charged on the higher
quality product without having to adjust price and quality of the lower quality product. Thus,
when participation changes at the margin, profit on those still buying goes up.
Suppose such a mixed-strategy image building product line is optimal. The structure of this
product line is the same as in the pure strategy image building apart from the fact that some
type 10 consumers do not buy anything and image as well as quality of the lower quality product
deteriorate. While average quality changes, this type of equilibrium does not give fundamentally
different insights than what we learn from the pure strategy equilibria. Qualitatively, the
only profitable randomization induces an image building product line but does not change the
intuition of the results.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium without Assumption 1. The result is
illustrated in Figure B3
Proposition B5. Suppose αn, αs, β and q ∈ (αn, 1) are such that profit from image building
with randomization is strictly higher than profit from any other product line for some λ > 0.
If such q exists, there are λˆ(q) < λ˜m <
ˆˆ
λ(q) such that image building with randomization gives
highest profits for all λ ∈ [λˆ(q), ˆˆλ(q)].
Proof. Profit from image building with randomization is given in B15 where
(RL −R(0))−1 = (1− αn(1− β)− αs(1− q)β − qβ)(αn(1− β) + (1− αs)qβ)
(1− αs)(1− αn)(1− β)β
is the inverse of the image premium from buying low quality instead of not buying at all.
It is easily verified that the profit function from image building with mixing is continuous,
increasing, and concave in λ for λ ≤ (RL−R(0))−1 and linearly increasing for λ > (RL−R(0))−1.
I have shown in Lemma A7 that profit from image building in pure strategies is continuous,
increasing, and concave in λ for λ ≤ λ2 and linearly increasing for λ > λ2.
Both product lines give the same profit for λ = 0, ΠI |λ=0 = Πmix|λ=0. Furthermore, if
λ˜m > λ2 the slope from profit with mixing is always greater than the slope from profit with
image building:
∂ΠI
∂λ
|λ=λ˜m <
∂Πmix
∂λ
|λ=λ˜m
Moreover, the slope from profit with mixing is lower than the slope from profit with exclusive
good when evaluated at λ = (RL −R(0))−1.
This can be seen relatively easily by assuming that λ ≥ (RL − R(0))−1 such that also three
profit functions are linear. Profit from exclusive good and deterministic image building are linear
for any λ > λ2 and λ2 < (RL−R(0))−1. Since, profit from mixing is linear for λ > (RL−R(0))−1,
concave for smaller λ, and continuous in λ, the slope for any smaller λ is only greater such that
the first inequality still holds.
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λ˜m
image building
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2
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with randomization
of type 10
Figure B3: Equilibrium in monopoly without Assumption 1.
The case where λ˜m < λ2 is more complicated since then only profit from exclusive good is
linear. However, we know that profit from mixing and profit from image building are concave
and that at λ = 0, both give the same profit. Furthermore, one can show that for λ < λ2 the
following holds:
∂2Πmix
∂λ2
≥ ∂
2ΠI
∂λ2
Since ∂
2Πmix
∂λ2
< 0 and ∂
2ΠI
∂λ2
< 0 this means that the slope of profit from image building is
decreasing faster than the slope from profit with mixing. From this we know that if for some
λ > 0 profit from mixing is higher than profit from image building and ∂Π
I
∂λ |λ < ∂Π
mix
∂λ |λ, then
mixing will give higher profit than image building for all λ′ > λ subject to the assumption that
λ′ < λ2.
Since for λ = 0 profits are equal, this implies that profit from mixing and profit from de-
terministic image building cross at most once for λ < λ2 with profit from image building with
randomization coming from below (and additionally the two product lines give the same profit
for λ = 0).
Combining the two insights for λ < λ2 and λ > λ2, I have shown that if mixing is best for
some λ > 0, then there exist q ∈ (αn, 1) and λˆ(q) < ˆˆλ(q) such that mixing with an induced
participation probability q for type 10 maximizes profit for λ ∈ [λˆ(q), ˆˆλ(q)].
In the first part, I have shown that the slope of mixing for λ > λ˜m is lower than the slope
of exclusive good profits. Thus, if profits haven’t intersected before, they will not do so later.
Thus, I have also shown that λˆ(q) <
˜˜
λm <
ˆˆ
λ(q).
B.8. Constant unit cost
Suppose the unit cost is constant in quality, c(s) = c > 0 and utility from obtaining quality s
is equal to s. Suppose further that quality cannot exceed 1, e.g. because quality is the fraction
of high quality inputs into the final good. I assume that producing quality is cheap enough
relative to the value of image and the type distribution for it being profitable to sell to engage
in product differentiation and where marginal utility from quality exceeds its marginal cost, i.e.
c < max{1, λ β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn }.
As in the setup with quadratic costs of quality, there are four possible sortings in the coordi-
nation game among consumers. Optimal products which sustain these equilibria are presented
in Table B1.
I derive the optimal products as follows:
Standard good (sg): If λ < 1, type 01 does not want to buy at the monopoly price p = 1
even for maximal image R = 1. If λ > 1, however, separation requires: λR(ssg, psg) < psg and
ssg ≥ psg. Since profit is increasing in psg and thus in ssg, set ssg = 1 and psg = ssg. Separation
is then sustainable if and only if λR(ssg, psg) < 1⇔ λ < 1.
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product line group products: (quality,price)
Image value λ ≤ 1 1 < λ ≤ λ1 λ1 < λ ≤ λ2 λ2 < λ
standard 00,01 (0,0) -
good 10,11 (1,1) -
mass 00 (0,0) (0,0)
market 01,10,11 (1, λ β
β+(1−β)αn ) (1,1)
image 00 (0,0) (0,0)
building 01,10 (λ
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn , λ
β(1−αs)
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn ) (1,1)
11 (1,1 + λ
(1−β)αn
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn ) (1,1 + λ
(1−β)αn
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn )
exclusive 00,01,10 (0,0)
good 11 (1,1 + λ 1−β
1−βαs )
Table B1: Characterization of possible product lines with constant unit cost
Mass market (mm): Denote the product for the mass market by (smm, pmm). Types 10 and
01 buy if p ≤ min {s, λR(smm, pmm)}. It is R(smm, pmm) = α11+α10α01+β . Then, since there is no
separation, smm = 1. Note that for λ > λ1, λ
β
β+(1−β)αn > 1 and thus price is not bound by
valuation of type 01 for image anymore, and therefore p = 1.
Image building: Denote by (sH , pH) and (sI , pI) the high and the lower quality product in
this product line. Images are given through the sorting. To gain the most from separation,
high quality must be set at its maximum, sH = 1, and price is set at the highest value
which is still incentive compatible, pH = pL + (sH − sL) + λ(R(sH , pH) − R(sI − pI)) =
1 + λ (1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+(1−β)αn . For the lower quality product, the monopolist sets price such as to
keep the type with lower willingness to pay just indifferent between buying and not buying,
sL = min{sL, λ β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn }. Thus, he will set quality such as not to exceed the value of
the associated image, sL = min{1, λ β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn }. To summarize:
sL = pL =
{
λ β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn if λ < λ2
1 else.
To maximize profits, the monopolist does not want to increase the quality of the lower quality
product even though marginal cost are constant. The reason is that providing sL > λRL
tightens the upper bound on the high quality product’s price more than necessary and thereby
reduces profits.
Exclusive good (eg): To sustain a sorting where only type 11 buys, the price has to be high
enough, peg ≥ max {λ, seg}. Furthermore for type 11 to buy, peg ≤ seg + λ 1−β1−βαs . To maximize
profits, the monopolist sets seg = 1, and peg = 1 + λ
1−β
1−βαs .
Given these four product lines, I compute profits as summarized in Table B2 and identify
which of those gives the highest profit for given type distribution and value of image.
Note first, that mass market never maximizes profits and I can restrict attention to the
remaining three types of offers.
ΠM −ΠE =

αsβ(αn+β−(αn+αs+λ(1−αs))β)
−αn−(1−αn−αs)β < 0 if λ < λ1
−α2n(1−β)2+αn(λ−2(1−αs))(1−β)β−(1−αs)2(1−λ)β2
−αn−(1−αn−αs)β < 0 if λ1 < λ < λ2
αnαsλ(1−β)β
−αn−(1−αn−αs)β < 0 if λ > λ2
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product line profit
Image value λ ≤ 1 v < λ ≤ λ1 1λ1 < λ ≤ λ2 λ2 < λ
standard good β(1− c) -
mass market ((1− β)αn + β)(λ ββ+(1−β)αn − c) ((1− β)αn + β)(1− c)
image building ((1− β)αn + β(1− αs))(λ β(1−αs)β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn − c) ((1− β)αn + β(1− αs))(1− c)
+βαs(1 + λ
(1−β)αn
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn − c) +βαs(1 + λ
(1−β)αn
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn − c)
exclusive good βαs(1 + λ
1−β
1−βαs − c)
Table B2: Profits with constant unit cost
0
standard good
λ˜m
image building
1
˜˜
λm
exclusive good
2
Figure B4: Equilibrium in monopoly with constant unit cost c(s) = c < c¯.
It is straightforward to see that indeed for small λ, standard good is optimal, i.e. there exists
λ˜ > 0 such that for λ < λ˜ standard good maximizes profits. It is equally easy to see that there
exists
˜˜
λ large enough such that exclusive good maximizes profits.
When we look at the profit functions for the different product lines, we find
∂ΠS
∂λ
= 0
∂ΠE
∂λ
=
βαs(1− β)
1− βαs
∂ΠI
∂λ
=
{
β(1− αs) + βαs(1−β)αnβ(1−αs)+(1−β)αn if λ < λ2
βαs(1−β)αn
β(1−αs)+(1−β)αn if λ > λ2
It is
∂ΠE
∂λ
>
∂ΠS
∂λ
and
∂ΠI
∂λ
>
∂ΠS
∂λ
and
∂ΠI
∂λ
|λ>λ2 <
∂ΠE
∂λ
⇔ αn < 1
Finally, the slope of ΠI decreases at λ = λ2. I conclude that, if there is λ such that image
building is optimal, then there exists an interval [λ˜,
˜˜
λ] such that image building is optimal for
all λ ∈ [λ˜, ˜˜λ].46
If I define now λ˜ and
˜˜
λ as the values of image for which image building gives the same profit
as does standard good (λ˜) and image building gives the same profit as does exclusive good (
˜˜
λ),
the profit maximizing equilibrium takes the same form as in the case with quadratic costs which
is illustrated in Figure B4.
For λ < λ˜, the monopolist offers a standard good, for λ˜ < λ <
˜˜
λ he offers an image building
product line and for λ >
˜˜
λ, he offers the exclusive good.
So far, I have ignored the possibility of randomization. From the main text and B.8 we know
that with quadratic cost, there is only one type of randomization which is profitable for certain
parameter constellations. Type 10 could mix between buying the lower quality product in a
46c < c¯. Having cost c < c¯ = (1−αs)
2β(αn(1−β)+β(1−αsβ)2)
α2nαs(1−β)3+(1−αs)3β2(1−αsβ)+αn(1−αs)(1−β)β(1+αs(1−2β))
ensures that image build-
ing is profitable for lower values than is the exclusive good, i.e. λ˜ <
˜˜
λ.
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two-product line and not buying at all. In analogy to the analysis with quadratic unit costs,
one can derive precise conditions for the optimality of randomization. However, this would go
beyond the scope of this robustness check. Proposition B7 shows that there are parameters such
that randomization by type 10 is not profitable with constant marginal cost of quality. Note
that the proposition derives sufficient conditions and their not being fulfilled does not imply
that randomization is optimal.
Proposition B6. Suppose marginal cost of quality is constant. For each set of parameters,
αs, αn, β, λ, such that βαs < αn(1 − β) + β(1 − αs), there exists cˆ > 0 such that for c ≤ cˆ
a two-product mechanism where type 10 randomizes between buying the lower quality from the
monopolist and not buying at all gives lower profit than a deterministic mechanism where type
10 buys the low quality product with certainty.
Proof. Suppose an image building product line is offered and denote the high quality product by
(sH , pH), the low quality product by (sL, pL). Suppose a fraction q of type 10 consumers buys
(sL, pL) and the remaining fraction of (1 − q) of type 10 consumers does not buy but obtains
(0, 0). I compare the gain in profit from selling this product line with partial participation over
the one where all type 10 consumers participate.
∆Π = ΠrandI −ΠdetI
= αsβλ(
(1−β)αn
(1−β)αn+β(1−αs) −
(1−β)αn
(1−β)αn+qβ(1−αs))
− (1− q)β(1− αs)(λ (1−β)αn(1−β)αn+β(1−αs) − c)
− ((1− β)αn + β(1− αs))λ( β(1−αs)(1−β)αn+β(1−αs) −
qβ(1−αs)
(1−β)αn+qβ(1−αs))
= (1− q)(c− λ (1−β)αn((1−β)αn+β(1−αs)−βαs)((1−β)αn+β(1−αs))((1−β)αn+qβ(1−αs)))
Then,
∆Π < 0
⇔ c < λ (1− β)αn((1− β)αn + β(1− αs)− βαs)
((1− β)αn + β(1− αs))((1− β)αn + qβ(1− αs)) =: cˆ(B16)
For c ≤ cˆ, profit with randomization is lower than with deterministic participation. Further-
more, the term is decreasing in q, such that no randomization is profitable starting from q = 1.
The intuition behind this finding is that for costs low enough, the cost saving from selling to
fewer consumers does outweigh the loss from selling to them. We also learn from this special
case with constant cost, that if randomization is profitable with quadratic cost, this is related
to the fact that underproducing quality for the low quality product (i.e. sL < 1) is not efficient
and thereby dropping some of this consumers in exchange for higher prices from those served
at efficient levels, may pay off.
The threshold cˆ from (B16) is positive as long as the fraction of image and quality concerned
consumers is small enough, i.e. βαs < αn(1− β) + β(1− αs)⇒ cˆ > 0
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